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CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES: A PRIMER
(Part One)*
THOMAS J. GALLAGHER, JR.**
I. OVERVIEW
A. Capital Gains and Losses
1. Introduction
Gain or loss from the sale or exchange of certain types of property
held for more than one year is treated differently from income from
services, sales of goods, and other routine activities. The type of
property that may give rise to such gain or loss is referred to as a
capital asset. The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) defines
"capital assets" in section 1221 to include all classes of property
(with certain exclusions), I regardless of the length of time that they
are held.2 The excluded classes of property generally are related to
property used in trade or business. The design of section 1221 is to
distinguish gain which arises over an extended period of time from
that which arises from everyday occurrences.
In general, gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset
is "capital gain" which may qualify for special tax treatment, or
"capital loss" which may be subject to restrictions on deductibility.
Whether gain or loss falls within the special rules covering capital
assets ordinarily depends upon whether (1) it arises in a transaction
involving a "sale or exchange," (2) of a "capital asset," (3) which
has been "held by the taxpayer." However, there are special statu-
tory provisions that artificially provide capital gain or loss treat-
ment to some situations which actually do not involve the sale or
exchange of a capital asset.3 Conversely, some transactions, which
* Part Two, consisting of sections III., IV., and V., will appear in the next issue of this
Review.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this article are entirely those
of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recom-
mendations of the Joint Committee on Taxation, United States Congress.
** Legislative Attorney, Joint Committee on Taxation, United States Congress. A.B. 1971,
Villanova University; J.D. 1974, Loyola University (New Orleans); LL.M. 1975, Yale Univer-
sity. Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; the
United States District Court, N.J.; and the United States Tax Court.
1. See generally Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains
Taxation (pts. I, 11), 59 YAL L.J. 837, 1057 (1950); Silverstein, The Capital Asset Definition,
1959 Tax Revision Compendium 1285; see also, E. COLSON, CArrAL GAINS AND LossES (1975);
Hjorth, An Introduction to Capital Gains and Losses, 41 WASH. L. REV. 764 (1966).
2. For a discussion of the holding period, see section IV., Gallagher, Capital Gains and
Losses: A Primer (Part Two), to be published in vol. 7:2 of FLA. ST. U.L. REv. [hereinafter
cited as Part Two].
3. See Part Two, supra note 2, section III.H. regarding statutory sales or exchanges.
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appear to involve the sale or exchange of a capital asset, are placed
outside the boundaries of the capital gain and loss rules.4
The precise reasons for treating capital gain or loss differently
from other gain, loss, or income are not crystal-clear. The tradi-
tional arguments in favor of a different treatment include the fol-
lowing: (1) the sale or exchange of a capital asset usually involves
only a change in the form of the taxpayer's investment; (2) gain or
loss essentially is a reflection of the price structure and therefore is
illusory; and (3) generally gain which has accrued over a substantial
time period should not be subjected to the progressive tax rates in
the year in which it is realized because this will result both in a
greater tax than that which would have been payable had the gain
been realized annually, and it will force the taxpayer to keep his
investment.5 But regardless of why Congress actually accorded capi-
tal gains and losses special treatment, the decision has been made
and is manifested by the basic provisions contained in sections 1201-
1255. Although the details of these provisions have changed since
their predecessors were enacted in 1921,6 the special treatment un-
derlying their existence has remained relatively constant.
The 1916 Revenue Act contained no provision which explicitly
covered gains and losses from dealings in property.7 Taxpayers
quickly contended, therefore, that gain realized on a sale of property
was not "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment.
In 1921, the United States Supreme Court rejected this argument
in Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, and upheld the inclu-
sion of capital gain in income.8
About the same time, Congress decided to tax capital gains at
lower rates than those which were applicable to other income. In
recommending the enactment of what was to become the Revenue
4. See section II.B. infra, for a discussion of the Corn Products doctrine; section ll.J. infra,
regarding the receipt or disposition of income-related items; Part Two, supra note 2, section
III.B.-G. for a more complete discussion of different kinds of sales or exchanges.
5. See Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957);
Folsom, Capital Gains, Consumption, Capital Gains Taxes and the Supply of Savings, 19
NAT'L TAX J. 434 (1966); Halperin, Capital Gains and Ordinary Deductions: Negative Income
Tax for the Wealthy, 12 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 387 (1971); Katsoris, In Defense of
Capital Gains, 42 FoRDaM L. REV. 1 (1973); Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appre-
ciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967); Wallich, Taxation of Capital Gains
in the Light of Recent Economic Developments, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 133 (1965). See also M.
DAVID, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION (1968).
6. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, § 106(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227; see H.R. REP. No. 350,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921). For an excellent history of the capital gains provisions up
to 1951, see TAX ADvIsoRY STAFF, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREAT-
MENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES (1951).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. II) C.B.
255.
8. 255 U.S. 509, 3 A.F.T.R. 3102 (1921).
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Act of 1921,1 the House Ways and Means Committee reasoned that
special tax rates were necessary to relieve reluctance to sell capital
assets because of "fear of prohibitive tax."' 0 The more favorable tax
rate adopted in 1921 was modified by the 1934 Revenue Act to
require that less than the entire amount of capital gains be included
in income." The amount excludible depended on the length of time
that the taxpayer owned the property. Both the preferential rate
and inclusion provisions were changed substantially by the 1942
Revenue Act, which simply imposed a flat rate on part of the gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than six
months. 2 With the exception of the recent increase in the holding
period necessary for longterm capital gain treatment, and some in-
tervening definitional and rate changes, the congressional solicitude
for capital gains has remained largely stable since the 1942 Act. 3
The limited deductibility of capital losses from ordinary income,
first enacted in 1924," is a corollary of the preferential treatment
accorded capital gains. The Ways and Means Committee report
noted that the full deductibility of capital losses from ordinary in-
come was an "injustice to the Government" since it allowed taxpay-
ers too much leeway to take advantage of losses while paying a lower
tax on capital gains. 5 All subsequent acts have retained some form
of restriction on the deductibility of capital losses from ordinary
income."
2. In General
Gain or loss usually will not be characterized as "capital" unless
it meets the express statutory requirements. Generally, whether a
gain or loss is "capital" rather than "ordinary" depends upon: (1)
its arising from a "sale or exchange,"" (2) of property that is a
9. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, 42 Stat. 227 (1921) (current version at I.R.C. §§
1202, 1211).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 350, supra note 6.
11. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, § 117(a), 48 Stat. 680 (1934) (current version
at I.R.C. § 1202). The Revenue Act of 1978 repealed the noncorporate alternative tax (§
1201(b), (c)). Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 401 (1978).
12. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, § 150(a), 56 Stat. 798 (1942) (current version
at I.R.C. § 1223).
13. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) amended § 1202 by increasing the
deduction from gross income from 50% to 60%. See generally sources cited at notes 1 & 5
supra; see also Blum, The Decline and Fall of Capital Gains: 1921-1957, 28 TAXMs 838 (1950).
14. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, § 208(c), 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (current version
at I.R.C. § 1211). See generally Warren, The Deductibility by Individuals of Capital Losses
Under the Federal Income Tax, 40 U. Cm. L. Rev. 291 (1973).
15. H.R. REP. No. 67-1388, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 2 (1923).
16. See generally Warren, supra note 14.
17. I.R.C. § 1222. For a discussion of the concept of "sale or exchange," see Part Two,
supra note 2, section H.
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"capital asset," and that (3) is held by the taxpayer.'" However,
some events which do not involve a sale or exchange, and some
property which is not a capital asset, are characterized artificially
as "capital" by the Code." Similarly, some events which appear to
satisfy the general requirements are characterized otherwise. 0 Fi-
nally, there is a narrow, but uncertain, area in which both the prop-
erty and the transaction involved seem to meet the statutory re-
quirements, yet are characterized differently by a well established
judicial gloss. 2' As a result, whether a gain or loss is capital or
ordinary depends not only upon satisfying the general statutory
prerequisites, but also upon avoiding the broad exceptions carved
out from those requirements.
3. Definitional Problems"
Normally, taxpayers will have little problem in determining
whether their property is a capital asset, which, when sold or ex-
changed, will result in a capital gain or loss. As long as the property
and its disposition meet the statutory requirements, without falling
into one of the exceptions, the gain or loss realized merely will be a
question of amount and not of character. However, much litigation
has taken place due to the special tax treatment accorded capital
assets and to the lack of precise definitions in the Code as to what
constitutes a capital asset. Section 1221 defines a capital asset sim-
ply as "property" held by the taxpayer, then lists several excep-
tions. Consequently, in many instances taxpayers have attempted,
ingeniously, to structure their transactions to avoid the capital
asset exceptions, and to bring them within the more favorable provi-
sions. As a result, the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) and
the courts are prone to interpret the exclusions broadly, except
where the taxpayer seeks to obtain ordinary-rather than capi-
tal-loss treatment for transactions that fall within the statute.u
18. I.R.C, § 1222. For a discussion of the holding period, see Part Two, supra note 2,
section IV.
19. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1231, regarding property used in a trade or business and involuntary
conversions.
20. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1236, denying capital gains treatment to dealers in securities.
21. See section II.B. infra, for a discussion of the Corn Products doctrine.
22. See generally Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 5
A.F.T.R.2d 1770 (1960); Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 628 (2d Cir.
1962); Del Cotto, "Property" in the Capital Asset Definition: Influence of "Fruit and Tree,"
15 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 (1965); Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69
HARv. L. Rzv. 985 (1956); Comment, The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and
Ordinary Income, 73 YALE L.J. 693 (1964).
23. See, e.g., Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 47 A.F.T.R. 1789
(1955), discussed at section ll.B. infra. See also Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of
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The resulting tension inevitably leads to some inconsistent and irre-
concilable decisions.24 Nonetheless, as a general rule the taxpayer
usually can determine in advance the proper classification of gain
or loss arising from the sale or exchange of property.
B. The Statutory Provisions
1. In General
The general rules for determining whether property is a capital
asset are contained in section 1221. It provides that the term
"capital assets" includes all classes of property unless excluded spe-
cifically by that section. The exceptions include: (1) inventory,
stock in trade, and property held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business; (2) depreciable property and real
property used in a trade or business; (3) copyright, literary, or simi-
lar property held by a creator, or by certain transferees; (4) accounts
or notes receivable acquired in a trade or business; (5) certain gov-
ernmental obligations; and (6) federal publications received at less
than fair market value. With this definition in mind, the task facing
taxpayers and the courts is to give meaning to the statutory frame-
work.
2. Stock in Trade or Inventorial Property
In part, section 1221(1) excludes from capital asset status
"[s]tock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on
hand at the close of the taxable year ... ."5 The purpose of this
exclusion is to distinguish between the routine receipts of a business
and the gain or loss from investment.2 Generally this is an easy
task, and one which rarely leads to litigation.
Although the above-quoted part of section 1221(1) contains two
categories of property, stock in trade and property includible in
inventory, neither can exist realistically without being held by the
Taxation, in UNivEasrrY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW THImTErNTH TAX INsTrrtuE
1 (J. Ervin ed. 1961).
24. See generally Chirelstein, Capital Gain and the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The
Income Tax Treatment of Contract Termination Payments, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1964); Del
Cotto, supra note 22; Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income-the
Ferrer Case, 20 TAX. L. Rav. 1 (1964); The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and
Ordinary Income, supra note 22.
25. Also, section 1231 excludes stock in trade from "quasi capital asset" status. See Van
Suetendael v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 654, 34 A.F.T.R. 638 (2d Cir. 1945) (taxpayer unsuc-
cessful in claiming to be dealer in securities so as to qualify for ordinary loss treatment under
I.R.C. § 1231).
26. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 17 A.F.T.R.2d 604 (1966).
19791
8 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
trade or business.2 7 The principal question that will arise with re-
gard to this part of section 1221(1), therefore, is whether the prop-
erty is held for that purpose. With few exceptions, everyday mer-
chandise, goods, products, and property includible in inventory will
be easily identified.
Stock in trade and inventorial property does not lose its character
when the taxpayer makes a bulk sale of that property. In Drybrough
v. Commissioner, the taxpayer sold his collection agency business
and was denied capital gain treatment on that portion of the sale
allocable to the collection claims which were considered to be his
stock in trade.18 Other claims, not owned by the taxpayer, but col-
lectible by his agency, were accorded capital asset treatment on the
theory that they constituted a mass asset in the nature of goodwill.2"
Gain attributable to the sale of these files was capital gain.
Depending on the surrounding facts and circumstances, when a
liquidating corporation distributes its inventory to its stockholders,
who then sell the property, the sale may result in capital gain even
though a sale by the corporation would have generated ordinary
income. 30 But whefe there is a single shareholder who decides to
liquidate the corporation, or where the shareholders sell the distrib-
uted property in a manner similar to that of the corporation's busi-
ness, the gain will be ordinary income .3
Under section 1221(4), accounts receivable arising on the sale of
inventory property are excluded from the category of capital as-
sets.32
3. Property Held for Sale to Customers
As noted previously, section 1221(1) excludes from the definition
of capital asset stock in trade, property includible in inventory, and
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of the taxpayer's trade or business. The purpose of section 1221(1)'s
exclusion is to distinguish profits and losses from daily business
operations and gain or loss from an investment.33
27. Wood v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 213, 225-26 (1951).
28. 45 T.C. 424 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 384 F.2d 715, 20 A.F.T.R.2d 5678 (6th Cir. 1967).
29. 45 T.C. at 437; see section H1.15. regarding allocation on the sale of a business.
30. Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947, 48 A.F.T.R. 979 (8th Cir. 1956); Grace
Bros. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170, 37 A.F.T.R. 1006 (9th Cir. 1949). But see Baker v.
Commissioner, 248 F.2d 893, 52 A.F.T.R. 707 (5th Cir. 1957).
31. See id.
32. See section I.E. infra for a discussion of accounts and notes receivable.
33. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 17 A.F.T.R.2d 604 (1966); Corn Products Ref. Co. v.
Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 47 A.F.T.R. 1789 (1955).
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Section 1231(b)(1)(A), (B) includes a similar exclusion, but it
provides more favorable tax treatment, in some instances, than the
capital gain rules. Section 1231 allows capital gain, but ordinary
loss, on the sale, exchange, and specified other dispositions of real
property and depreciable property held for more than one year and
used in a trade or business .3
a. Primarily for Sale
In Malat v. Riddell, the Supreme Court was asked to interpret the
word "primarily" in section 1221(1).11 There, the taxpayer was a
member of a partnership which developed and acquired rental
realty. The partnership, in turn, was a participant in a joint venture
which had acquired a parcel of land.36 The joint venturers subdi-
vided and sold part of the property after encountering financing
problems, and reported the gain as ordinary income. When addi-
tional financing problems were aggravated by zoning restrictions,
the taxpayer decided to sell his interest. He reported his gain as a
capital gain. The Service challenged this characterization, asserting
that the joint venture had the dual purpose of developing the parcel
or holding it for resale. In either event, the government took the
position that any gain was taxable as ordinary income because the
tract was held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of the taxpayer's business .3 Conversely, the taxpayer claimed that
the parcel was held for development, and that he was entitled to
capital gains treatment because the property was not held primarily
for sale in the ordinary course of his business. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had affirmed the district court's finding for the
Commissioner.8
The Supreme Court rejected the Service's argument that the word
"primarily" meant substantial and reversed the lower courts. The
Court stated:
The purpose of the statutory provision with which we deal is to
differentiate between the "profits and losses arising from the
everyday operation of a business" on the one hand (Corn Products
Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52) and "the realization of ap-
preciation in value over a substantial period of time" on the other
(Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Co., 364 U.S. 130, 134.). A literal
34. For a full discussion of section 1231, see section I.D. infra.
35. 383 U.S. -569 (1966). See generally, Bernstein, "Primarily for Sale": A Semantic Snare,
20 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1968).
36. 383 U.S. at 569.
37. Id. at 570.
38. Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1965).
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reading of the statute is consistent with this legislative purpose.
We hold that, as used in § 1221(1), "primarily" means "of first
importance" or "principally." 9
On remand, the district court found that the realty was not held
primarily for sale to customers. 0
In holding that the word "primarily," as used in section 1221(1),
meant "of first importance" or "principally," the Supreme Court
rejected the interpretation of the word as meaning a substantial
purpose for holding the property. The latter construction had pre-
vailed in the Tax Court41 and in the Second" and Ninth Circuits,' 3
while the one adopted by the Supreme Court had been the position
of the Eighth Circuit."
Despite the interpretation of the word "primarily" in Malat,
many questions and problems remain in attempting to classify a
particular taxpayer's holding of specific property. When the prop-
erty is similar to inventory or stock in trade, and when the taxpayer
is in the trade or business of selling that property, few issues will
arise-except where the taxpayer contends that some of the prop-
erty is held for his own investment account. At one time this was a
particularly acute problem where the taxpayer was a securities
dealer who also invested in securities. However, since the enactment
of section 1236, which requires such persons to identify investment
property by following the prescribed guidelines," the gfeatest
amount of litigation has involved real estate" and the sale and
rental of equipment. 7
Aside from these issues, Malat still requires a determination that
the taxpayer is in a trade or business in the ordinary course of which
39. 383 U.S. at 572.
40. Malat v. Riddell, 275 F. Supp. 358, 18 A.F.T.R.2d 5015 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
41. See, e.g., Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 20 (1963), rev'd in part,
341 F.2d 683, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1965); Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.
1010 (1950), aff'd 190 F.2d 263, 40 A.F.T.R. 1006 (9th Cir. 1951).
42. See, e.g., S.E.C. Corp. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 717,49 A.F.T.R. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), aff'd per curiam, 241 F.2d 416, 52 A.F.T.R. 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909
(1957).
43. See, e.g., Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 40 A.F.T.R. 1006 (9th Cir.
1951), aff'g 15 T.C. 1010 (1950).
44. Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 408 (8th Cir.
1965), rev'g in part, 41 T.C. 20 (1963).
45. See section I.B. infra.
46. See, e.g., Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-
679 (5th Cir. 1976), and cases cited therein.
47. See, e.g., Continental Can Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-652
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970), discussed infra at notes 51-60 and accompanying
text.
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the property is primarily held for sale to customers.48 This, in turn,
necessitates the finding that the taxpayer has customers and that
the property is, or would be, disposed of in the ordinary course of
the taxpayer's business.
In addition, Malat did not address the interrelated questions of
the point in time at which the purpose of the holding is crucial, or
what actions are necessary to establish a definitive change of pur-
pose in the holding. Naturally, all property offered for sale is held
primarily for sale at the time of sale; therefore, some other more
relevant time period must be selected on which to focus. Moreover,
Malat offers no guidance in the situation where a taxpayer decides
to terminate a business or to liquidate an investment which can be
accomplished most profitably only by a period of recurrent sales or
improvement activities. Here the question is hybrid: whether the
sales occur in a trade or business and are inside or outside the
ordinary course of any business, as well as being held primarily for
sale to customers. A similar issue, and one on which Malat is equally
silent, arises when the purpose for holding the property changes
within the context of an ongoing business in which the property
formerly was not held primarily for sale to customers. 9
Perhaps one of the most significant issues left untouched by the
Court's decision in Malat, especially in view of its impact under
both sections 1221(1) and 1231,10 is whether a taxpayer may hold the
same property in the business "primarily" for two different pur-
poses. That is: Can an apparently single business actually be di-
vided with regard to, and for the purpose of, characterizing the same
type of property or its components? This question was presented to
the court in Continental Can Co. v. United States.5 There the tax-
payer manufactured and sold containers to customers in the ordi-
nary course of its business. Prior to an adverse antitrust consent
decree involving a tying arrangement, the company had leased can-
closing machines to the purchasers of its containers. As a result of
the antitrust action the company was required to grant to its closing
equipment lessees the option to purchase the machines. In conjunc-
tion with the granting of these options, the company began a general
sales program designed to sell the closing machines.52
48. See Juleo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 47, 32 A.F.T.R.2d 73-5275 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1103 (1973).
49. See, e.g., Continental Can Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-652
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
50. See Juleo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 47, 32 A.F.T.R.2d 73-5275 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1103 (1973).
51. 422 F.2d 405, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-652 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
52. Id. at 407-08.
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The average age of the machines sold was nearly seventeen years.
In contrast, at the time the tax dispute arose the closing equipment
had been offered for sale for less than a year. The company argued
that these figures, when compared, established that the closing
machines were capital assets, and that gain on their sale was capital
gain resulting from the "realization of appreciation in value accrued
over a substantial period of time."5 3 The machines were held, it
contended, primarily for rent, not for sale, since they were "separate
from the main-stream of the enterprise."5
The court rejected the company's arguments, reasoning that a
change of purpose in holding the machines, prompted by the anti-
trust action, occasioned the taxpayer's entry into the operation of a
dual business, both of renting and selling the machines. Therefore,
the reason for which the property was held prior to the change of
purpose was unimportant: the time was. With regard to the primary
purpose of the holding, it was held to be the date of the sale." Here,
the court found that the company was engaged in the regular sale
of the machines, and thus in the dual business of selling (both the
containers and the previously tied-in closing equipment) and rent-
ing. 5
In arriving at its decision, the Continental Can Co. court distin-
guished a series of decisions, relied upon by the company, referred
to as the "liquidation" cases.5 7 The court explained that the essence
of the liquidation cases was the final and nonrecurring disposition
of a holding or business, "such as small sales resulting from the
inability to dispose of inherited or investment property en bloc, or
the winding up (due to a reorganization, insolvency, etc.) of a busi-
ness operation or a phase thereof." 8 Here, the sales were made as
an incident of starting a new business-the antithesis of the liquida-
tion cases.
The fact that the company's sales efforts were not too extensive
did not convince the court that the machine sales were incidental
to a rental business:
53. Id. at 409 (quoting Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572, 17 A.F.T.R.2d 604 (1966)).
54. 422 F.2d at 409.
55. Id. at 410; see Nadalin v. United States, 364 F.2d 431, 18 A.F.T.R.2d 5158 (Ct. Cl.
1966); Recordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 6092 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
56. 422 F.2d at 410; see Recordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460,462, 12 A.F.T.R.2d
6092 (Ct. CI. 1964).
57. 422 F.2d at 411; see, e.g., Ackerman v. United States, 335 F.2d 521, 14 A.F.T.R.2d
5307 (5th Cir. 1964); Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5451 (5th Cir.
1963); Estate of Barrios v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 517, 3 A.F.T.R.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1959);
Cebrian v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 412, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 904 (Ct. CI. 1960).
58. 422 F.2d at 411.
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In [such a dual business setting, the word] "primarily" invokes a
contrast, not between selling and renting, but between selling in
the ordinary course of business and selling outside of that normal
course. . . . [T]he goods are held "primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of. . . trade or business" because they are
regularly offered for sale to customers as part of the normal opera-
tion of the enterprise. No case of this kind has allowed capital gains
treatment."9
In conclusion the court explained that the substantial apprecia-
tion of the property over a prolonged period of time did not alter the
fact that it was held for, and sold to, customers in the ordinary
course of the taxpayer's business. 0
b. Factors Related to the Determination of the Existence of an
Investment or Business
Because of the particularly factual nature of determining whether
property is held as an investment or for sale to customers as an
incident of the ordinary conduct of the taxpayer's business, the
courts have developed a number of factors which they generally use
to make the distinction. Among those cited most frequently are:"'
1. The income from the sales of the property in question, espe-
cially in relation to sales of other property, and the taxpayer's
other income;
2. The extent and intensity of sales and promotional activity;
3. The presence of an unrelated principal business;
4. The length of time that the property was held, together with
any time necessary for development or management;
5. The method of, and the reason for, acquiring the property and
disposing of it;
6. The value of retained property of a similar nature;
7. The use of the sales proceeds (i.e., were the proceeds used to
purchase additional property of the kind sold?);
8. The presence of substantial appreciation;
9. If the property is realty, whether it has been improved or sub-
divided;
10. Again, if the property is realty, whether it was sold by the
taxpayer, if he was not a broker, or with the use of a broker;
59. Id. (quoting Recordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460, 463, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 6092
(Ct. Cl. 1963)).
60. 422 F.2d at 411. See also Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 37
A.F.T.R.2d 76-679 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. See generally United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 24 A.F.T.R.2d 69-5760 (5th
Cir. 1969); Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94, 13 A.F.T.R.2d 1571 (2d Cir. 1964); Levin,
Capital Gains or Income Tax on Real Estate Sales, 37 B.U.L. Rav. 165 (1957).
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11. The taxpayer's other sources and amounts of income, includ-
ing the history of income and losses.
Although no one of these factors is determinative, and no preestab-
lished number of them inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
property is held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business, there are certain patterns of facts which probably
will lead to th conclusion that property is or is not held for sale to
customers. For example, in Goodman v. United States, the taxpayer
had a history of realizing greater amounts of income from participa-
tion in his clients' real estate endeavors than he did from the prac-
tice of law.62 When this fact was joined with the significant number
of sales, the court of claims concluded that the taxpayer was holding
the property for sale in the ordinary course of business even though
the parcels were sold in an unimproved and undeveloped state. 63
The court simply explained that "there is no one formula for deter-
mining whether property is held for sale or investment. Each case
presents its own unique set of facts, all of which must be considered
''64
Conversely, in Mitchell v. Commissioner5 the Tax Court found
the absence of improvements, subdivisions, and other activities to
be persuasive as to the taxpayer's investment purposes. At the same
time, it rejected the Service's argument that the real estate activi-
ties of the corporation in which Mitchell was an officer and share-
holder should be attributed to him. The court found them to be
"immaterial and irrelevant" because they were part of a separate
enterprise."6
When the taxpayer initially acquires the property intending to
resell it, the courts have divided over whether it is held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade
or business. 7 Those courts which have found such a holding proba-
bly are correct. But when the acquisition is an isolated event, it is
more accurate to find that the taxpayer is an investor, and is not in
the business of holding property primarily for sale to customers. 6 Of
62. 390 F.2d 915, 918, 21 A.F.T.R.2d 761 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
63. Id. at 921.
64. Id. at 919. But see Lazarus v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 421, 3 A.F.T.R.2d 1079 (Ct.
CI. 1959).
65. 47 T.C. 120 (1966).
66. Id. at 127. See also Brown v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 514, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5611 (10th
Cir. 1971); Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266, 17 A.F.T.R.2d 1213 (Ct. CI. 1966).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426, 22 A.F.T.R.2d 5746 (5th Cir. 1968),
and cases cited therein.
68. See DeMars v. United States, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-925 (S.D. Ind. 1968); Hollis v.
United States, 121 F. Supp. 191, 46 A.F.T.R. 74 (N.D. Ohio 1954). See also Bauschard v.
Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 1725 (6th Cir. 1960).
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course, the particular situation may indicate otherwise.
If the taxpayer is a partner, shareholder, or joint venturer in an
enterprise which is in the business of selling property of a nature
which the taxpayer, after holding for investment purposes, may sell
on his own account, the courts should scrutinize the facts carefully
before attributing the enterprise's activities to the taxpayer. Other-
wise, the congressional purpose underlying the differentiation of
capital assets may be frustrated."
c. Real Estate Dealers and Investors
Many of the factors enumerated above are used by the courts to
separate the real estate dealer from the real estate investor. But
because real property generally is thought of as the classic invest-
ment, the courts and the Service have experienced much difficulty
in separating the two.T
In classifying property under section 1221(1), the purpose for
which the asset is acquired may or may not be an important consid-
eration depending on other facts, such as whether a resale intent
was effected, a development aborted, or an investment liquidated.
More simply, the taxpayer's intention when the property is acquired
is not necessarily relevant to a subsequent disposition. For instance,
property that is inherited must await further action before it can be
placed within section 1221(1). If the taxpayer proceeds to subdivide
and improve it he may be found to be a dealer, and hence the realty
will be covered by section 1221(1) unless section 1237 provides an
exception." If the devisee is presently a dealer in the type of prop-
erty inherited, he may find it difficult to establish that the property
is not held for sale. Unless the devised property is treated differently
than similar assets held for sale, the heir is sure to find it governed
by section 1221(1).
The time expired between the property's acquisition and disposi-
tion will not necessarily favor the finding of an investment-the
hallmark of a capital asset. In Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United
States, the Fifth Circuit found that the taxpayer had acquired the
land in question over an extended period of time with the dual
intention of holding the property as an investment and of farming
it until it had appreciated in value."2 The court found further that
the investment aspects of the property gave way to the company's
development and sale of over one thousand lots. The facts demon-
69. See id.
70. See Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94, 13 A.F.T.R.2d 1571 (2d Cir. 1964).
71. See notes 82-97 and accompanying text infra."
72. 526 F.2d 409, 421, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-679 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
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strated that the taxpayer had shed its investment frock, so that the
gain was ordinary income.7 3
However, even a dealer is entitled to capital gains on his invest-
ments. The crux of the problem is proving the existence of the
investment when one is made in the same kind of property in which
the taxpayer deals. Scheuber v. Commissioner74 is an example of
how a dealer established to the satisfaction of the court that a parcel
of land was held for investment and not primarily for sale to custom-
ers in the ordinary course of his real estate business. Scheuber pre-
sented evidence that the land in question represented his retirement
annuity, which was "cashed-in" when it became sufficiently valu-
able.75
Although all the facts and circumstances are relevant to the clas-
sification of a dealer's property as an investment or as being held
for resale, some activities that may appear neutral or irrelevant in
fact may become pivotal in a subsequent litigation. Thus in
Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, the district court held that
the taxpayer was entitled to capital gains on its sale of numerous
lots which had been held for a substantial period of time." A panel
of the Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision; however, in an en banc
rehearing the full court reversed.77 The court reasoned that the num-
ber of sales, together with a favorable economic market, indicated
that the taxpayer was a dealer in the property. Moreover, it pointed
out that no advertising or other explicit promotional activity was
necessary because the combination of economic forces and available
land resulted in the implicit advertising of the property: potential
buyers received "inherent notice" that the land was for sale when
they saw it gradually being improved.78 From here it was an easy
step to conclude that the land, acquired as an investment, was held
primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business, even though no
customers were solicited, and no for-sale signs were posted.
The "inherent notice" aspect of property development, subdivi-
sion, and sales not only indicates the nature of the taxpayer's activi-
ties, but also evinces the ordinariness with which the property is
73. Id.
74. 371 F.2d 996, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1967).
75. Id. at 999. See also Johnson v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 412, 20 A.F.T.R.2d 5873
(N.D.N.Y. 1967), for a similar conclusion even though the property had been listed on the
taxpayer's real estate inventory sheet.
76. 356 F. Supp. 1331, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-956 (W.D. La. 1973).
77. 509 F.2d 171, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1019 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 526 F.2d 409, 37 A.F.T.R.2d
76-679 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). See generally Sills, The "Dealer-Investor"
Problem Revisited: Charting a Course to Avoid the Pitfalls, 4 J. REAL EST. TAX. 24 (1976).
78. 526 F.2d at 418.
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held and sold.7" Conversely, intermittent sales of unimproved, un-
subdivided, or large parcels of property may support a finding of an
investment-even if the section 1237 safe-harbor rules are not met."'
Similarly, physical problems, governmental restrictions, unfavor-
able economic conditions, or sales solicited from outsiders may bol-
ster the taxpayer's arguments for capital gains.8
Congress enacted section 1237 in 1954 to ameliorate the situation
of the investor-subdivider who holds real property as an invest-
ment.8" Often an investor is faced with the unpleasant alternative
of being classified as a "dealer" if he does, and of foregoing a reason-
able profit if he does not subdivide the realty. However, section 1237
is of limited applicability, and does not apply to corporate taxpay-
ers.
Under section 1237 a subdivider will not be classified as a dealer,
which would cause any gain to be ordinary income, merely because
of the fact of the subdivision;' however, the taxpayer cannot other-
wise be a dealer in real estate. To meet the statutory requirements
of section 1237, the taxpayer must show that: (1) neither the tract
nor any part of it has been held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of trade or business;" (2) during the year of the subdivision
and sale of the tract, he held no other real property for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;" (3) he has
owned the property for five years, unless acquired by inheritance; 8
(4) he has made no substantial increase in the value of the parcel
sold;87 and (5) no such improvements are required to be made by the
taxpayer under a contract of sale.8
Whether an improvement is substantial, and substantially en-
hances the value of a lot, is a factual question. However, the regula-
tions accord the taxpayer a safe harbor, stating that improvements
79. Id.; see United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 912, 24 A.F.T.R.2d 69-5760 (5th Cir.
1969)(the court in Biedenharn Realty Corp. stated that this was implied in Winthrop).
80. See notes 82-97 and accompanying text infra.
81. See Levin, supra note 61 for an extensive list of the cases and factors used by the
courts.
82. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1954). See generally Chandler, The Failure
of Section 1237 in Dealing with Sales of Subdivided Realty, 60 MINN. L. REV. 275 (1976);
Repetti, What Constitutes a Dealer under Section 1237, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SEVEN-
TEENTH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 651 (1959); Spandorf & Tonelson, Capital Gains
Provisions for Real Estate Investors in Sec. 1237 More Promise Than Fact, 8 J. TAX. 201
(1958).
83. I.R.C. § 1237(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(a)(1), (2) (1957).
84. I.R.C. § 1237(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(a)(2)(1957).
85. I.R.C. § 1237(a)(1); see Hvidsten v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 856, 6 A.F.T.R.2d
5414 (D.N.D. 1960).
86. I.R.C. § 1237(a)(3).
87. Id. § 1237(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(a)(2), (c) (1957).
88. I.R.C. § 1237(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(c) (1957).
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which increase the value of a lot by ten percent or less shall not be
considered substantial."9 For example, clearing operations, mini-
mum access roads, or a temporary field office are not considered to
be substantial. 0 In addition, if the taxpayer has held the parcel or
lot for ten years or more, certain other improvements which are
necessary for marketability, such as the installation of drainage,
sewage, or water facilities, will not be "substantial" under section
1237."1
For purposes of section 1237, a "tract of real property" is a single
parcel, or two or more parcels which at any time were contiguous
in the hands of the taxpayer.92
If the taxpayer meets these requirements, gain realized on the sale
of the first five lots during the taxable year is capital gain. Any sale
made in or after the year in which the sixth lot is sold from a single
tract is subject to a special five percent rule. 3 Gain on these sales
is ordinary income in an amount up to, but not exceeding, five
percent of the sales price. The remainder of any gain is capital
gain. 4 Where two or more contiguous lots are sold to the same buyer
in a single transaction, the taxpayer is considered to have sold one
lot9 5
If the taxpayer sells more than five lots, the five percent rule
applies to all lots sold. For example, if he sells six lots from the same
tract in any year, five percent of the sale price of each lot is treated
as ordinary income. Nevertheless, if the five percent rule applies,
the taxpayer may offset selling expenses entirely against the ordi-
nary income portion of the proceeds. Consequently, the only ordi-
nary income that is reportable is that portion of the five percent in
excess of the selling expenses. If these expenses exceed the five
percent, they reduce the taxpayer's capital gain.
Although section 1237 is of limited applicability, it can apply
more than once to the same taxpayer." For example, if the taxpayer
sells no lots for five years after having sold a parcel, then that part
of the tract remaining is considered to be a new tract under section
1237(c). Therefore, the taxpayer can sell five more lots prior to the
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(c)(3)(ii) (1957).
90. Id. § 1.1237-1(c)(4); see Revell v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-877 (D.S.C. 1972)
(roads substantially increased the value of the property); Rev. Rul. 59-31, 1959-1 C.B. 215.
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(c)(5) (1957).
92. Id. § 1.1237-1(g)(1) (1957).
93. I.R.C. § 1237(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(a)(5), (e)(2)(ii) (1957).
94. I.R.C. § 1237(b)(1); for the relationship between sections 1237 and 1231, see Treas.
Reg. § 1.1237-1(f) (1957).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(e)(2)(i).
96. Id. § 1.1237-1(e)(2)(ii).
97. Id. § 1.12 3 7 -1(g)(2).
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applicability of the five percent rule.
Section 1237 is not applicable to losses, and it is not exclusive.98
The investor-subdivider is free to establish his status as an investor
under the section 1221(1) factors used by the courts to determine
whether a taxpayer is a "dealer." 9 It would be to his advantage to
do so, provided that he can show his status as an investor, where
he has sold more than five lots from the same tract.
C. Property Used in Trade or Business
1. In General
Section 1221(2) excludes from the definition of a capital asset real
property and depreciable personal property used in the taxpayer's
trade or business.100 Although section 1221(2) denies capital asset
status to property of this type, section 1231 ordinarily will charac-
terize gain or loss from its sale, exchange, or involuntary disposi-
tion. 1'0 Under section 1231, qualified property-sometimes called
"quasi-capital assets"-will generate capital gain if it is sold at a
profit, but a deduction from ordinary income if it is disposed of at
a loss. To come within section 1231 the taxpayer must be engaged
in a trade or business and must establish that the property is used
in that trade or business. 0 2 It is insufficient that the taxpayer has
acquired property which he expects to use in a trade or business that
he plans to establish in the future. 03 This limitation is a corollary
to the section 162 limitation which denies the deductibility of ex-
penses as ordinary and necessary business expenses when they are
incurred in seeking or preparing to enter a trade or business.204
Prior to 1942, section 1221 excluded from capital asset status only
depreciable property used in the trade or business. This resulted in
strange decisions. For example, in the case of real estate, a building
used in the taxpayer's trade or business was not, but the land on
which it stood was, a capital asset. The statute was amended in 1942
to eliminate the difficult allocation problems which arose when a
98. Id. § 1.1237-1(a)(4).
99. Id.; see Gordy v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 855 (1961) (taxpayer showed he was not in
real estate business, and was accorded capital gains treatment).
100. I.R.C. § 1221(2).
101. Id. § 1231(b)(1); see section H.D. infra.
102. See I.R.C. § 1231(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1.
103. See, e.g., Nulex, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 769 (1958).
104. See Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953); Note, Depreciation of Improved Real
Property Held Solely for Later Sale, 27 STAN. L. REv. 177 (1974). But cf Snow v. Commis-
sioner, 416 U.S. 500, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-1251 (1974) (taxpayer was allowed a loss deduction
under § 174(a)(1) since the expenses incurred were "in connection with" his trade or business
of developing a special-purpose incinerator; the Court noted that § 174 was enacted to expand
the restrictive effects of § 162).
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lump sum sales price was received for the land and building. 5 Since
1942, all business real estate has been removed from section 1221,
regardless of whether it is depreciable. However, the allocation
problem still exists when determining the purchaser's depreciation
deductions, and when there is a sale of a business.'"'
Unlike real property, personal property is treated as a capital
asset under section 1221(2) and as a quasi-capital asset under sec-
tion 1231 only if it is depreciable; nondepreciable personal property
used in the trade or business, therefore, is a capital asset. Most
tangible personal property used in a trade or business is depreciable,
with the unusual exception of such items as antiques and art works
which will not meet the requirements of section 167.1"7 Intangible
personalty, such as goodwill, trade names, trademarks, and secret
processes, generally are nondepreciable. 05 Therefore, unless these
assets are held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness-an admitted rarity-they are capital assets. 09 Due to the
amounts involved, the decisions finding or assuming that goodwill
is a capital asset, because it is nondepreciable, are of particular
importance, especially in the sale of a business."0
2. The Use Requirement
To be excluded from capital asset status by section 1221(2), the
real and depreciable personal property must be used in the tax-
payer's trade or business. Both facets of this requirement have gen-
erated a significant amount of litigation, especially where the prop-
erty involved is idle at the time of its sale due to circumstances
outside of the taxpayer's control,"' and where there is a question of
whether the taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business."' A similar
problem arises in conjunction with section 1231 where property for-
merly used in the trade or business subsequently is held for sale."'
The leading case involving the question of whether property is
105. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 414.
106. See section 11.. infra.
107. See Rev. Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B. 79 (disallowing depreciation of works of art). But
see Judge v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 1243 (1976) (court indicated that some
"artwork" may be depreciable).
108. See section 11.1. and section I.H. infra as to these items; Gregorcich, Amortization
of Intangible: A Reassessment of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Good Will, 28 TAx LAw.
251 (1975); Comment, Depreciability of Going Concern Value, 122 U. PA. L. Rev. 484 (1973).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 194 F.2d 783, 41 A.F.T.R. 861 (10th Cir. 1952) (bus
franchise); Huckins v. United States, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 1222 (S.D. Fla. 1960) (secret process).
110. See section I.. infra.
111. See sources cited at note 121 infra.
112. See section I.C.3. infra.
113. Id.
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used in the taxpayer's trade or business is Carter-Colton Cigar Co.
v. Commissioner."' There, the company conducted its wholesale
tobacco products distribution business from a leased store and ware-
house in Charlotte, North Carolina. In 1926 it purchased an unim-
proved lot on which it planned to build a store and warehouse to be
used for its principal place of business. After having plans and speci-
fications prepared for the building, the company was unable to pro-
ceed with the construction due to the depression. In 1934 one of the
two major stockholders died, and thereafter the other abandoned
the idea of building the new store.
From 1935 to 1943 the lot was unsuccessfully offered for gale, but
in the interim a small amount of revenue was derived from its rental
for billboard advertising space. When in 1943 the company received
its first and only offer, the property sold for $4,000. The company
took an ordinary loss deduction of approximately $3,000, the
amount it lost on the sale, on the basis that the lot was property
used in its business. The government disallowed the loss on the
ground that the property was a capital asset, since it never was
actually used in the taxpayer's trade or business."5
The Tax Court allowed the ordinary loss deduction. It reasoned
that the property was used in the taxpayer's business within the
meaning of the statute because the evidence established that it was
purchased for business reasons, toward which significant steps were
taken. That the lot was not used to the full extent of the taxpayer's
initial expectations was excused by the "later developing circum-
stances over which [it] had no control" and which prevented the
construction."' The slight income that the company received from
the advertising lease was irrelevant to the court's decision."7
In Carter-Colton Cigar Co., the court cited Wright v.
Commissioner"' for support. Wright had owned two summer cot-
tages that he held out for rent. Several months after one of the
cottages was destroyed by a hurricane, he listed the land for sale.
When he sold the land five years later, he deducted the damage from
the hurricane as an ordinary loss. The Commissioner contended
that the loss was capital. The court allowed the ordinary loss, ex-
plaining that even though the real estate had ceased to be used
actively in the taxpayer's business, it had not lost its character as
"real property used in his trade or business," and thus it was not a
114.. 9 T.C. 219 (1947).
115. Id. at 220.
116. Id. at 221.
117. See id.
118. 9 T.C. 173 (1947).
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capital asset."' Relying on section 167(a)(1) precedent, the court
read the term "used in the trade or business" synonymously with
"devoted to the trade or business."'' 0 This construction was broad
enough to encompass all such property, whether actually in use or
not, even after the actual business had become impossible.'
Despite the broad interpretation given to the word "used" in sec-
tion 1221(2) by the Tax Court in Wright and Carter-Colton Cigar
Co., not all property acquired by the taxpayer for use in its trade or
business will be excluded from capital asset status if it is never used
in that trade or business. For instance, in Davis v. Commissioner
the taxpayer purchased a lot on which he intended to build a paint
shop.'1 However, at the time of purchase, he was unaware that the
property was zoned exclusively for residential use. Twenty years
after discovering the zoning restrictions, he sold the lot at a loss. The
court held that the lot was a capital asset because it was not and
never could have been used in the taxpayer's trade or business.
Therefore, the loss was a capital loss.123
Unlike the situation in Wright, where the real estate had been
used for business purposes, and that in Carter-Colton Cigar Co.,
where all preparations had been completed to use the lot for the
wholesale business, the taxpayer in Davis was not thwarted by ex-
ternal circumstances over which he had no control or of which he
could have had no knowledge. Moreover, in the absence of a vari-
ance, the property purchased for the paint shop simply could not
have been used for that purpose. Therefore, because the proximate
relationship between the property and the business, evident in
Wright and Carter-Colton Cigar Co., was missing in Davis, the
property could not come within the reasoning of the Wright decision
as being "devoted" to use in the taxpayer's trade or business.
Admittedly the line drawn between these situations is a fine one,
but in Davis there simply was no way of telling whether the property
119. Id. at 174.
120. The word "devote" appears to come from Fackler v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 708,
714 (1941), aff'd, 133 F.2d 509, 30 A.F.T.R. 932 (6th Cir. 1943).
121. 9 T.C. at 174. See also Wofac Corp. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 654, 19 A.F.T.R.2d
1601 (D.N.J. 1967) (land, building, and equipment idle for five years); Kruse v. Commis-
sioner, 29 T.C. 463 (1957) (ordinary loss allowed for theater closed for more than six months
prior to foreclosure sale); Alamo Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 534 (1950)
(ordinary loss allowed when diesel unit bought in Mexico had to be sold there on failure to
obtain permission of Mexican government to export unit to United States); Wilson Line, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 394 (1947) (dismantled parts of marine railway were used in trade
or business five years after dismantling); Rev. Rul. 58-133, 1958-1 C.B. 277 (ordinary loss
allowed when land purchased for business use was sold at a loss after engineering study
showed it was unsuitable for taxpayer's needs).
122. 11 T.C. 538 (1948).
123. Id. at 541.
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was purchased for business use, or because of its residential zoning:
that is, for investment or personal reasons. Without some unequivo-
cal indication of the business character of the property, it met the
definition of a capital asset under section 1221. To hold otherwise
would allow business taxpayers to avoid downside investment risks
by the availability of an ordinary, rather than a capital, loss.' 4
3. Rental Activity
Section 1221(2) excludes only real property and depreciable per-
sonal property used in the trade or business. Since corporations are
presumed to be in business, the only real question as to corporate
property generally is whether the asset is used in that business. 2 5
However, individually owned property often raises many questions
concerning the existence of a trade or business. And if there is a
trade or business, the question then becomes whether the property
involved is used in that business so as to preclude it from capital
asset characterization by section 1221(2). Most frequently these is-
sues arise in regard to individually owned rental real estate. 2 If an
individual owns rented real estate which subsequently is sold at a
loss, he may be facing not only the prospect of a capital loss, but
also the very real possibility that no loss deduction will be allowed
because the court found that he did not enter the rental activity for
profit.'2 Consequently, the stakes are likely to be higher when an
individual, as opposed to a corporation, attempts to establish that
rental realty is used in his trade or business.
When an individual taxpayer owns a multi-occupant building,
the responsibilities of renting and maintaining the structure will put
him in the rental business, regardless of whether the taxpayer or an
agent carries out those duties. 128 For example, in Fackler v.
Commissioner the court found that the rental activities constituted
a trade or business notwithstanding that the taxpayer, "a busy and
124. Cf. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 47 A.F.T.R. 1789 (1955)
(taxpayer was allowed ordinary loss).
125. See International Shoe Machine Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157, 33 A.F.T.R.
2d 74-619 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 384 (1974); International Trading Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 275 F.2d 578, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1960).
126. See generally Brown, Individual Investment in Real Estate: Capital Gains vs Ordi-
nary Income; Attaining Nondealer Status; Structuring Disposition of Investment; Dealer as
Investor; Implications of Investor-Dealer Partnership, in NEw YORK UNiVERSrrY SCHOOL OF
LAw THnrry-FourTH TAX INsTrruTE 189 (S. Reiner ed. 1976).
127. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(a), (b); see, e.g., Warren, supra note 14. But
see International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 578, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 970 (7th Cir.
1960). See also International Trading Co. v. Commissioner 484 F.2d 707, 32 A.F.T.R.2d 73-
5500 (7th Cir. 1973).
128. See, e.g., Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 509, 30 A.F.T.R. 932 (6th Cir. 1943);
Union Nat'l Bank v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 382, 8 A.F.T.R.2d 5133 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
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successful lawyer," merely visited the property once or twice
weekly.'29 The evidence showed that the taxpayer acquired the prop-
erty for the purpose of operating it for a profit commensurate with
the number of tenants and the amount of services required to be
rendered. 3 0 It was irrelevant that the taxpayer supplied the services
through agents and employees because "carrying on a business
through agents . . . is in fact a common practice. 11 3'
If the property is unimproved land, or a single-family dwelling,
the classification of the taxpayer's holding is a much closer ques-
tion. Whether the rental activity will be treated as a business de-
pends upon many factors, no one of which is always decisive. 132
Some of the factors considered by the courts include:
33
1. The nature of the taxpayer's principal business, i.e., whether
it is related to rental real estate;
2. The amount of income generated by the rentals as compared
to the amount and sources of the taxpayer's other income, if
any;
3. The time spent by the taxpayer and/or his employees in man-
aging the property and providing services;
4. Whether the property is, or has been, used for personal or
recreational purposes by the taxpayer; 134
5. The manner in which the taxpayer acquired the property, es-
pecially if it is one of several which he has owned;' 13 and,
6. The manner in which the activity was carried on, including the
history of income or losses.Ix
The weight given to any one of these considerations depends on the
particular facts under consideration.
Many of the older cases appear to be quite liberal in classifying a
single rental property as a trade or business. This tendency is ex-
129. 133 F.2d 509, 510, 30 A.F.T.R. 932 (6th Cir. 1943).
130. Id. at 511.
131. Id.
132. See Comment, The Single Rental as a "Trade or Business" under the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (1955).
133. See, e.g., Lowry v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 257, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 74-6206 (D.N.H.
1974); Roehner & Roehner, Loss Deduction on the Sale of an Abandoned Residence: Case-
Law Thinking in Statutory Interpretation, 23 FORDHA L. REv. 196 (1954); Swanson, Loss on
the Sale of Residential Property, 33 TAXES 589 (1955).
134. See, e.g., Lowry v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 257, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 74-6206 (D.N.H.
1974) and the cases cited therein. See also I.R.C. § 183; Carey & Gallagher, Requisite Greed:
The Section 183 Regulations, 17 TAX CouNsELOR's Q. 375 (1973).
135. Compare Grier v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 395, 45 A.F.T.R. 1975 (D. Conn 1954),
aff'd per curiam, 218 F.2d 603, 46 A.F.T.R. 1536 (2d Cir. 1955), with Hazard v. Commissioner,
7 T.C. 372 (1946).
136. See generally Carey & Gallagher, supra note 134.
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plained in part by the fact that prior to 1942, when section 167(a)(2)
was enacted, depreciation deductions were allowed on property only
if it was "used in the trade or business." Similarly, an individual
could deduct the expenses of managing property only if they quali-
fied as section 162 business expenses. Apparently the deductions
were allowed on the rationale that rental property constituted a
trade or business. Since the enactment of sections 167(a)(2) and 212,
however, there has been less reason to use this theory, and therefore
more consistency in finding the rental property to be a capital
asset.'
D. Copyrights, Literary, Artistic and Similar
Interests and Patents
1. Copyrights, Literary, Artistic and Similar Interests
Section 1221(3) excludes copyrights, literary, musical, or artistic
compositions, letters and memoranda, in the hands of the person for
whom they were prepared, and similar property from classification
as a capital asset if it is held by a taxpayer whose "personal efforts"
created the property.'3 In addition, they are denied capital asset
characterization if held by a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of
the property is determined, for purposes of determining the gain
from a sale or exchange, in whole or part with reference to the basis
of the property in the hands of the person whose efforts created the
property. "9 In excluding "similar property" from the special treat-
ment accorded to capital assets, the proscription is expansive
enough to include such interests as theatrical productions, radio
programs, newspaper cartoon strips, and any other property which
qualifies for either statutory or common law copyright protection. 0
But it does not cover designs, inventions, or patents, which are
137. See I.R.C. § 183. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added § 280A to the Code to deal
specifically with vacation homes and the expenses incurred in relation to them. See also
Giordan v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 497 (1976) (disallowing, in part, maintenance
deductions for Florida real estate even where rentals exceeded expenses, since taxpayer had
received the property from deceased spouse). The Giordan court cited H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 162-65 (1975). 45 T.C.M. (P-H) at 499 n.3.
138. See generally F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ARTWORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTIcE (1974);
Beghe, The Artist, the Art Market and the Income Tax, 29 TAX L. REV. 491 (1974); Duke,
Foreign Authors, Inventors, and the Income Tax, 72 YALE L.J. 1093 (1963); Gorewitz,
Artists/IRS: A Modest Proposal, 119 CONG. REc. 39090 (1973); Rosenbaum, Entertainer's
Corporations and Capital Gains, 12 TAx L. Rav. 33 (1956); Shine, Some Tax Problems of
Authors and Artists, 13 TAx L. REv., 439 (1958).
139. Tress. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1); see Beghe, supra note 138, at 493-94.
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1); see Stern v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 847, 2
A.F.T.R.2d 5741 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 957, 3 A.F.T.R.2d 717 (5th Cir.
1959). See also Cranford v. United States, 338 F.2d 379, 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5904 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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protected exclusively under sections of the patent, and not copy-
right, law.' 4' Finally, section 1221(3) assets do not qualify as "quasi-
capital assets" under section 1231(b)(1)(C)." 2
The statutory terms "property" and "personal effort" are among
the problem areas of section 1221(3), as can be seen by the decision
in Stern v. United States."' In that case, which involved both pre-
and post- section 1221(3) years, the taxpayer created "Francis," a
talking army mule, which was the subject of several short stories
written by the taxpayer while he was in the army.' After his dis-
charge the plaintiff published two novels dealing with Francis' ex-
ploits. These efforts culminated in the sale to Universal Studios of
the motion picture rights and all of the taxpayer's "right, title and
interest" in Francis. In return for the transfer the taxpayer was to
receive $50,000, five percent of the net proceeds from the movies,
and seventy-five percent of any incidental licensing fees. 4'
Because the transaction covered both pre- and post- section
1221(3) years, the court found that the taxpayer had realized capital
gains as to the pre-statutory period since Francis was "property"
created by the taxpayer outside the realm of his usual business
activities as a newspaper publisher: creating Francis was a hobby,
not a business."' However, as to the years in which section 1221(3)
applied, the proceeds were found to be ordinary income generated
by "similar property" within the purview of section 1221(3). The
court rejected the taxpayer's contentions that, because Francis was
not subject to copyright, the income generated by the sale was capi-
tal in nature being derived from the disposition of an "intellectual
conception.""' 7 Instead, the court adopted the view that the charac-
ter Francis was inseparable from the literary description given it in
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(I).
142. Id. § 1.1231-1(c)(1)(ii); see section II.D. infra for a discussion of section 1231. But
see Desilu Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (P-H) 1856 (1965); Griffin v. Commis-
sioner, 33 T.C. 616 (1959) for exceptions where the owner is a purchaser or legatee.
143. 164 F. Supp. 847, 2 A.F.T.R.2d 5741 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 957,
3 A.F.T.R.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1959). See generally Linton, Tax Problems with Television Proper-
ties: Films, Copyrights and Property Rights, 26 J. TAx. 240 (1967).
144. 164 F. Supp. at 848.
145. Id. at 848-49.
146. Id. at 851-52. Prior to the enactment of § 1221(3), copyrights, literary compositions,
and other property created by the personal efforts of the taxpayer were treated as capital
assets only when the "creator" was an amateur. Otherwise, the property was said to be
primarily for the purpose of sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, thus ex-
cluded from the definition of capital asset by § 117(a)(1)(A), now § 1221(1). Cranford v.
United States, 338 F.2d 379, 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5904 (2d Cir. 1944). Compare Herwig v. United
States, 105 F. Supp. 384, 42 A.F.T.R. 147 (Ct. Cl. 1952) and TeLinde v. Commissioner, 18
T.C. 91 (1952) with Rider v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 524, 42 A.F.T.R. 993 (8th Cir. 1952) and
Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466, 32 A.F.T.R. 1005 (2d Cir. 1944).
147. 164 F. Supp. at 851.
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the novels, so that regardless of its susceptibility to copyright, it was
a "literary composition" or "similar property"; therefore, it came
within the congressional intent to deny capital gains treatment to
income derived by the taxpayer whose personal efforts created the
property upon its disposition.4 8
The Stern discussion of "similar property," particularly that not
susceptible to copyright, was amplified in Cranford v. United
States.'49 There the court of claims was presented with the issue of
whether section 1221(3) applied to a plan that was to be developed
into a television or radio program. The taxpayer's "intellectual con-
ception" involved a mathematical formula allowing a quiz program
sponsor to give away money to contestants on a progressive basis.
No aspect of the scheme was subject to copyright.'50 After being
submitted to an agency in return for a seventy-five dollar assign-
ment and a moral obligation for additional amounts if successful,
the plan was implemented in a program format."' The taxpayer
received weekly payments from the agency pursuant to the "moral
obligation clause" and subsequently received an additional pay-
ment repr esenting a one-third interest in the licensing of a television
show.'52 Like the Stern taxpayer, Cranford contended that section
1221(3) was inapplicable because his idea was not subject to copy-
right and therefore could not fall within the definition of "similar
property."'53
The court of claims rejected this argument. It construed the
"similar property" clause as an expansion of the "copyright, liter-
ary, musical or artistic" clause of section 1221(3), and found that
Congress intended that section to encompass products of personal
efforts. Copyright protection was irrelevant. "[AIll types of artistic
works which are products of personal effort and skill are excluded
from the definition of a capital asset, by virtue of the term 'similar
property,' unless specifically excepted.' '54
By definition, section 1221(3) applies only to one whose personal
148. Id. at 852; cf. Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1962)
(the proceeds of a contract selling the right to make the film "The Glenn Miller Story" were
ordinary income: the "right" was not "property"); Regenstein v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 183
(1960) (the court, suggested that an employee group insurance plan created by a specialist
was "similar property" and that it was not "property": decided on other grounds). See also
Del Cotto, supra note 22; Eustice, supra note 24.
149. 338 F.2d 379, 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5904 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
150. Id. at 380.
151. Id. at 380-81.
152. Id. at 381.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 384. See also Desilu Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (P-H) 1856 (1965);
Regenstein v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 183, 190 n.2 (1960).
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efforts created such property, or whose basis for purposes of deter-
mining gain or loss on sale or exchange is determined in whole or
part with reference to the basis of the property in the creator's
hands.5 5 Consequently, incident to the disposition of such property
by a taxpayer not covered by section 1221(3), questions of character-
ization may arise as to whether the property was held in the
"ordinary course" of the taxpayer's business or as an investment.'56
In contrast to the tax treatment of the individual creator is that
accorded to a corporate producer of literary property, shown by
Revenue Ruling 55-706.11 The principal corporation was engaged in
the production and distribution of motion pictures. It sold two
hundred fully depreciated films to another corporation to convert
idle resources into working capital. The Service explained that al-
though many corporations produce section 1221(3) property, such
property is excluded therefrom because it is not produced by the
personal efforts of any one individual. 58 In addition, the Service
noted that because the sale was an isolated transaction, and the
property was not held primarily for sale, the taxpayer realized capi-
tal gain.'59
A- theory similar to that posited in Revenue Ruling 55-706 was
advanced in Commissioner v. Ferrer, 10 where the court stated that
section 1221(3) did not apply to the sale of production rights in a
play. The actor-taxpayer, a newly turned producer, entered into a
contract with the author of Monsieur Toulouse under which the
actor acquired a multitude of rights and a power of approval, or a
prohibitory power, as to some transactions. In return for a royalty
advance, Ferrer received a "lease" of the exclusive rights to the
United States production of the play, a right to forty percent of the
proceeds of a film, together with other rights if he produced the play,
155. Tress. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1).
156. See Fidler v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 138, 49 A.F.T.R. 400 (9th Cir. 1956); Griffin v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C. 616 (1959).
157. 1955-2 C.B. 300, modified, Rev. Rul. 62-141, 1962-2 C.B. 182.
158. 1955-2 C.B. at 301.
159. Id. at 302. The latter part of the Ruling, concerning capital gains, was modified in
Revenue Ruling 62-141 to guarantee that motion pictures would be considered to be held
primarily for sale to customers when the possibility of sale to television exists. 1962-2 C.B.
182. Moreover, where any film is produced for television rental and subsequently sold, §
1221(1) applies to both the rental and sale. Id. While the rationale of Revenue Ruling 62-141
appears sound, it still must square with the Supreme Court's decision in Malat v. Riddell,
383 U.S. 569, 17 A.F.T.R.2d 604 (1966). In Desilu Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(P-H) 1856 (1965), the Tax Court refused to adopt the Service's position in Revenue Ruling
62-141, on the ground that it both attempted to create an all-inclusive category and an
irrebuttable presumption of the taxpayer's dual purpose.
160. 304 F.2d 125, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 1651 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Eustice, supra note 24, and
section H.J.5. infra for the tax consequences of the sale of contract rights.
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and a power of prohibition on the disposition of the film rights.",
After executing the agreement, it was abandoned in favor of a film
contract with a third party. That agreement paid Ferrer a salary for
acting in the film and a percentage for releasing his interest in the
initial contract. 6 2
Although the Commissioner never asserted that any of the inter-
ests involved fell within section 1221(3), the court took it upon itself
to explain why the lease of the play was not covered by that section.
Emphasizing the intended narrow scope of "created by the personal
efforts of the taxpayer," the court found that production of the play
involved many persons other than the taxpayer, as well as a signifi-
cant amount of risked capital invested by him. For these reasons,
the court concluded that the taxpayer was not the "creator" of the
production.' 3
The support for this conclusion is tenuous. The Senate Report
states that "[tihe amendment [section 1221(3)] will also exclude
from the capital asset category any property similar to that specifi-
cally named; for example, a radio program which has been created
by the personal efforts of the taxpayer.' ' s4 This statement is supple-
mented by Treasury Regulation section 1.1221-1(c) which provides:
"the phrase 'similar property' includes for example, such property
as a theatrical production . . . ." In referring to a production rather
than to a play, it could be argued persuasively that the regulations
are intended to distinguish between the playwright and the play
producer, and to include both within the purview of section 1221(3).
A successful theatrical production requires both literary and artistic
factors which may be, but are not always, found in the play itself.
Moreover, the fact that both the Congressional Reports and the
Treasury Regulations refer to at least one other instance of separa-
tion of the composing from the presentation, that is, in radio pro-
grams, lends some support to this distinction between the activities.
The fact that the Ferrer court found the taxpayer to be a novice
producer gives no credibility to the court's dicta as to section
1221(3). It would, however, bolster the section 1221(1) finding that
the taxpayer did not release his rights under the initial contract "in
the ordinary course of his trade or business."'' 5 Section 1221(3) is not
addressed to the professional, as opposed to the occasional, copy-
161. 304 F.2d at 127-28.
162. Id. at 128.
163. See Del Cotto, supra note 22.
164. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 543
(emphasis added).
165. I.R.C. § 1221(1); see, e.g., Desilu Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 34T.C.M. (P-H) 1856
(1965); Griffin v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 616 (1959).
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right holder. Rather it is designed to reach the creator of the prop-
erty and anyone who holds such property with reference to the cre-
ator's basis. With these considerations in mind, Ferrer should not
be relied upon as authority for the proper construction of section
1221(3).1"6
Additonal problems encountered by a holder of an interest in a
copyright or artistic composition arise in determining whether pay-
ments received from the sale or exchange of the interest are actually
payments for a capital asset or for "collapsed anticipation of future
income."''6 The final holding in Ferrer illustrates the complexities
of this argument. The court held that both the "lease" of the play
and the power to prevent distribution of the motion picture rights
were capital assets. This conclusion was premised, in part, on the
finding that both rights constituted an "equitable interest" in the
copyrights: a "cloud" on the author's title.' 8
The court took a different approach in analyzing the remaining
interest-the right to receive a percentage of proceeds from sale of
the film rights. Because the right was contingent upon actual pro-
duction of the play, the court could have viewed Ferrer's right either
as an option to acquire an interest in the movie rights or as income
to be received for Ferrer's services in producing the play. Since the
contract was void of any language granting Ferrer an option, the
court chose to characterize the interest as a contingent right to
receive ordinary income in the future.' 9 Hence, Ferrer's release of
the right was only a "collapsed anticipation of future income."
In addition to generating many variations on this sort of problem
in classifying the asset, dispositions of creative property have
caused similar difficulties in determining whether a sale or ex-
change has occurred, or whether a license has been issued.' 0 The
conceptual problems involved here are analogous to those in the
assignment of income cases, especially since a license looks very
much like the fruit and not the tree."' But due to the many divisions
to which a copyright may be subjected, with each division retaining
its larger identity, most have been found to be sales even where the
166. See, Martin v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 347 (1968). See also Bellamy v. Commissioner,
43 T.C. 487 (1965) (taxpayer's release of rerun rights distinguishable from Ferrer's sale of the
lease; ordinary income rather than capital gain); Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, modified,
Rev. Rul. 62-141, 1962-2 C.B. 182 (isolated sale gets capital gain treatment).
167. See generally Del Cotto, supra note 22; Eustice, supra note 24; see also section Ih.5.
infra as to the sale of contract rights.
168. 304 F.2d at 133.
169. Id. at 133-36.
170. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26.
171. For a discussion of the "Fruit and Tree" and the assignment of income doctrines,
see Del Cotto, supra note 22.
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creator retains some rights under the copyright, or where payments
are made on an extended or contingent basis.' As a result, the
retention of royalties under an exclusive licensing agreement gener-
ally will be considered to be installment payments on the sale
price.1
Finally, it should be noted that although the primary operational
device in the television and film industries, especially with produc-
tion, is the percentage participation "lease," or license, congres-
sional action has been taken toward eliminating the conversion of
personal income into capital gains vis-a-vis the sale of participation
shares and/or corporate liquidations. 4 The two principal checks
have been the section 1221(3) noncapital asset characterization
upon transfer to a controlled corporation under section 351, and
section 341's collapsible corporation provisions which will cause or-
dinary income treatment of the gain realized on redemption. 7 '
2. Patents
In contrast to section 1221(3)'s treatment of copyrights and simi-
lar property, section 1235 provides that royalties and other income
paid to inventors, and certain other persons, in return for the trans-
fer of "all substantial rights" to a patent or to an interest therein,
qualify for long term capital gains. 7 6 Congress carved out this dis-
tinction to assure that income from the transfer of certain patents
would be taxed as long term capital gain, and thereby "provide an
incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of the Nation."'77
The professional inventor can report his normal income as long term
capital gain.'78
Provided that a holder of a patent, or of an undivided interest in
172. See generally Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125; Stem v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 847; Herwig
v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384, 42 A.F.T.R. 147 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1
C.B. 26; Del Cotto, supra note 22.
173. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125; Eustice, supra note 24; see Note, A Comparison of the Tax
Treatment of Authors and Inventors, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1419 (1957); Comment, Taxation of
Literary Property Income, 12 MERCER L. REv. 370 (1961). But see Cory v. Commissioner, 230
F.2d 941, 49 A.F.T.R. 379 (2d Cir. 1956).
174. See generally B. BrrrKEs & J. EuscE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OP CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS, 12.01-.09 (1971).
175. Id.
176. I.R.C. § 1235. See generally Morreale, Patents, Know-How and Trademarks: A Tax
Overview, 29 TAx LAw. 553 (1976). Expenditures for the self-development of patents are
deductible as business expenses under § 174(b), but only until a patent is issued. Tress. Reg.
§ 1.174-2(a)(1), 4(a)(2), (4). See also Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-
1251 (1974).
177. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954).
178. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5902 (1963); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-
2(d)(3).
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one, transfers property consisting of "all substantial rights to [it],
or of an undivided interest in all such rights to a patent," the trans-
fer is considered to be a sale or exchange of a capital asset held for
more than six months."' This characterization applies whether or
not the payments, in exchange for which "all substantial rights" are
transferred, are dependent upon the transferee's use of the patent
and are payable over the time that it is used.80 Moreover, Treasury
Regulation section 1.1235-1(c) (1) specifies that amounts received in
connection with, or as compensatory damages awarded for, patent
infringement are to be considered payments attributable to a sec-
tion 1235 transfer, to the extent that they are related to a transfer
which initially qualified under section 1235.181
This preferential treatment is, however, restricted to those per-
sons "whose efforts created [the] property," or who acquired their
179. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(a); see, e.g., Busse v. Commissioner, 479 F.2d 1147, 32
A.F.T.R.2d 73-5068 (7th Cir. 1973); Burde v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 995, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5885
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966); C.A. Norgren Co. v. United States, 268 F.
Supp. 816, 20 A.F.T.R.2d 5183 (D. Colo. 1967); Armco Steel Corp. v. United States, 263 F.
Supp. 749, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 461 (S.D. Ohio 1966).
Patent amortization comes under § 167, and may be subject to § 1245 recapture. See
Newton Insert Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 570 (1974).
"All substantial rights" are not conveyed where the patent holder retains rights "which are
of value at the time the rights to the patent. . . are transferred. "Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)
(emphasis added). See also Estate of Klein v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 617, 35 A.F.T.R.2d
75-457 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Mros v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 813,
33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-996 (9th Cir. 1974); Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655, 27 A.F.T.R.2d
71-381 (6th Cir. 1971); Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976).
Under the regulations it does not matter whether such rights are retained by the grantor
or by another. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1); see Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655, 27
A.F.T.R.2d 71-381 (6th Cir. 1971); Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976) (Wilbur, J.,
concurring).
A field-of-use license will not be a qualifying transfer if other rights of value are not
transferred to that transferee. The license must be to all practical fields. Estate of Klein v.
Commissioner, 507 F.2d 617, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-457 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991
(1975); Mros v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 813, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-996 (9th Cir. 1974); Fawick v.
Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655, 27 A.F.T.R. 2d 71-381 (6th Cir. 1971); Blake v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 7 (1976). The 1954 Senate Report explained:
By "undivided interest" a part of each property right represented by the patent
(constituting a fractional share of the whole patent) is meant (and not, for example,
a lesser interest such as a right to income, or a license limited geographically, or a
license which conveys some, but not all, of the claims or uses covered by the
patent).
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954) (emphasis added).
Geographically-restricted licenses probably are subject to similar treatment, see Morreale,
supra note 176, at 559-60, as are successive licenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(c)(3). But see Bell
Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1015 n.5, 20 A.F.T.R.2d 5153 (Ct. Cl.
1967). The result is questionable when the patent is part of a larger patented invention.
Compare Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162, 2 A.F.T.R.2d 6161 (3d Cir. 1958) with Treas.
Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(iv).
180. See, e.g., Poole v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 392 (1966).
181. See, e.g., Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976).
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interest from the creator for consideration in money or money's
worth prior to the time the patent was put into use.'
A "holder" of a patent is an individual whose efforts created the
patent property, and who would qualify as the "original and first"
inventor under the patent law.10 Alternatively, the holder may be
an individual who acquired his interest in the patent property, prior
to its actual reduction to practice, in exchange for consideration
paid to the inventor in money or money's worth, and so long as he
is related neither to the inventor nor the inventor's employer."" This
requires that the interest be acquired prior to the successful testing
and operation of the invention under operating conditions, and in
no event will a transaction qualify subsequent to the invention's
earliest commercial exploitation.' s5
The qualification on a holder's status prohibiting an employment
relationship is a flexible one, but it must be established contempo-
raneously with the acquisition of the substantive interest and when
the compensatory obligation is fixed definitely.' Once the holder
status is established, however, the consideration may be paid during
a subsequent employment relationship. But section 1235 is inap-
plicable if the payments are received as compensation for services
rendered by an employee under an employment contract which obli-
gates the inventor to transfer his rights to the employer. 8 7 Whether
the payments are for services or for a transfer of all substantial
rights, or of an undivided interest, in the patent property is a factual
question. Thus, depending upon the circumstances, holder status
may be attained despite the existence of an employment setting,
and especially if the payments are contingent upon the production,
182. See Busse v. United States, 543 F.2d 1321, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5984 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Burde v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 995, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5885 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 966 (1966). See generally Morreale, supra note 176; Comment, Capital Gains Treatment
on Proceeds from Patent Transfers, 34 Mo. L. Ray. 98 (1969).
183. I.R.C. § 1235; Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1). See generally Busse v. United States, 543
F.2d 1321, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5984 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (taxpayer must be a patent holder within
meaning of section 1235(a) or (b) to qualify for the section 483(f)(4) exception to the imputed
interest rule).
184. Busse v. United States, 543 F.2d 1321, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5984 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Burde
v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 995, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5885 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966
(1966).
The owner of a patent, however, may be able to obtain capital gain treatment outside of §
1235. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(b); Rev. Rul. 69-482, 1969-2 C.B. 164; see Thomson v. United
States, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-697 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Coplan v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957).
But see Taylor v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 1626 (1970); Poole v. Commissioner, 46
T.C. 392 (1966).
185. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(i), 2(e).
186. See Chilton v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 552 (1963), acq., 1964-1 C.B. 4.
187. See, e.g., Downs v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 533 (1968); Blum v. Commissioner, 11
T.C. 101 (1948), aff'd, 183 F.2d 281, 39 A.F.T.R. 665 (3d Cir. 1950).
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use, or sale of the transferred rights, or their value to the employer.
That is, the payments must be attributable to the transfer of the
patent rights and not to the fact of employment alone.' 8
While the section 1235 holder of a patent must be an individual,
regardless of whether he is in the business of making inventions or
buying and selling patents, each member of a partnership may qual-
ify individually for a share of the partnership's patent proceeds.
Moreover, each of the individual partner's distributive shares will
qualify even if the partnership is not comprised exclusively of such
persons. '9
Another restriction on the application of section 1235 is the exclu-
sion of certain related persons, corporations, and trusts from status
as a holder. Although the related persons rule of section 267(b) is
applicable in this regard, brothers and sisters may claim holder
status. 190
E. Accounts and Notes Receivable
Accounts and notes receivable acquired by the taxpayer for ser-
vices rendered in the ordinary course of his business or pursuant to
the sale of inventory, stock in trade, or property held for sale in the
ordinary course of that trade or business are excluded from the
definition of "capital assets" by section 1221(4).19, Therefore, if the
taxpayer accepts notes receivable in exchange for services, he must
report the fair market value of the obligation as income.' 2 If the note
is disposed of later for less than the previously reported amount, the
difference between the two figures represents an ordinary loss.'"
Conversely, a disposition in an amount in excess of that reported
initially is ordinary income.' 4
F. Disguised Interest Income
Section 1221(5) excludes from the term "capital asset" certain
short term government obligations issued at a discount and without
188. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(c)(2).
189. Id. § 1.1235-2(d)(2); Dunn, Tax Considerations in Patent Assignments and Licenses
between Related Corporations, 16 TAx L. REV. 315 (1961).
190. See also Rev. Rul. 69-482, 1969-2 C.B. 164; Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(b).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(d).
192. See, e.g., Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1967);
McFall v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936). See also sections lI.J. ., 4., 5. infra.
193. See Burbank Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 999 (1963), affd in part
and rev'd in part without discussion of this point, 335 F.2d 125, 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5349 (9th Cir.
1964); Rev. Rul. 73-558, 1973-2 C.B. 298.
194. Merchants Acceptance Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 988 (1964); see Mer-
chants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657, 42 A.F.T.R. 749 (5th Cir. 1952) (amounts
received on previously charged off notes were ordinary income).
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stated interest. Section 1221(5) excludes only obligations which
have a fixed maturity date no later than one year from the date of
issue. This exclusion was enacted in 1941, and was intended to bar
capital gain treatment for any amount of the discount because the
discount is the same as stated interest on an obligation issued at
face value. Because of their short term, section 1221(5) obligations
are unlikely to appreciate or decline in value. This, together with
the absence of stated interest, supports the legislative determina-
tion that the discount is equivalent to interest and should be taxed
as ordinary income.'95
G. Government Publications Received Without Charge or at a
Reduced Price
Section 1221(6), enacted by section 2132 of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, removes from the definition of a capital asset any United
States governmental publication that a taxpayer receives from the
government, or from any governmental agency, at other than the
price for which it is offered for sale to the public. The exclusion
applies to the taxpayer who received the publication from the gov-
ernment and to any taxpayer in whose hands the publication's basis
is determined in whole or in part by reference to the basis of the
taxpayer who received the publication from the government.'19 The
provision applies to sales, exchanges, and contributions made after
the effective date of the Act.
Section 1221(6) originated in the Senate's version of H.R. 10612;
there was no comparable provision in the House bill.' 97 The Confer-
ence Report states that the amendment to section 1221 was in-
tended to prevent taxpayers who received government publications
either without charge, "e.g., copies of the Congressional Record re-
ceived by Members of Congress," or at a reduced price, from claim-
ing a charitable contributions deduction for the full fair market
value of any governmental publications donated to a charity for a
use related to its exempt purpose. ' However, section 1221(6) is
phrased broadly enough to encompass much more than charitable
contributions. Indeed, it removes from section 1221 any governmen-
tal publication received free or at a reduced charge by the taxpayer
from the government or from any United States agency. It does not
appear to include literature or other publications that might be
195. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(e).
196. I.R.C. § 1221(6)(B).
197. See H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 399, 532, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4118, 4229.
198. Id.
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received free of charge from a United States office, but which are
not "publication[s] of the United States Government."
That both section 1221(6) and the underlying report refer to pub-
lications received without charge (or at a price other than that at
which the publication is offered for sale to the public) indicates that
no part of the publication is to be considered a capital asset and that
no part of the taxpayer's gain is to be treated as capital gain.199
Although it is not clear from the Senate's comments, section
1221(6) appears to be based on the reasoning that a taxpayer who
receives an item at the government's expense should not be permit-
ted to parlay that largesse into a double benefit.
II. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS
A. In General
Section 1221 broadly defines "capital asset" as "property held by
the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business)
. . . " and then lists six exceptions.200 This broad definition grants
taxpayers great leeway in structuring transactions so as to receive
either capital gain or ordinary loss treatment. In response to these
attempts to tamper with the basic capital asset definitional provi-
sions, the Congress and judiciary have created certain statutory and
judicial exceptions to section 1221. Congress has enacted Code sec-
tions to cover many common transactions that it determines should
or should not be eligible to receive the special tax treatment; the
courts have construed the relevant Code sections and provided judi-
cial glosses to establish a consistent treatment for those transactions
that do not specifically fall within the definitional provisions. This
section of the article deals with those exceptions.
B. The Corn Products Doctrine
One of the most well known judicial glosses on the definition of a
capital asset is the Corn Products doctrine.20' Essentially, the doc-
199. See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-679 (5th
Cir. 1976) (court rejected alternative of allocating gain between capital gain and ordinary
income).
200. I.R.C. § 1221(1)-(6).
201. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 47 A.F.T.R. 1789 (1955). See
generally Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, in UNIvERsrTY OF SOuTHERN
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW THIRTEENTH TAX INsTrruTE 1 (J. Ervin ed. 1961); Freeman, Is There
a New Concept of a Business Asset?, 36 TAXES 110 (1958); Javaras, Corporate Capital Gains
and Losses-The Corn Products Doctrine, 52 TAXES 770 (1974); Kauffman, A Second Look
at the Corn Products Doctrine, 41 TAXES 605 (1963); Note, Judicial Treatment of "Capital"
Assets Acquired For Business: The New Criterion, 65 YALE L.J. 401 (1956); 23 U. FLA. L. REV.
609 (1971).
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trine holds that property otherwise within the definition of a capital
asset may have such an important and integral relationship to the
ordinary conduct of the taxpayer's business that it loses its identity
as a capital asset and falls within one of the section 1221 exceptions.
Thus, depending on the relationship of the property to the business,
the asset may be found to be a part of that business, inventory, or
stock in trade, or held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of the taxpayer's trade or business.
The Corn Products doctrine is most frequently applied to the
purchase of securities, whose tax treatment depends on the purpose
for which they were acquired. Securities bought in the ordinary
course of business are non-capital assets, and any subsequent gain
or loss is ordinary. On the other hand, securities purchased as an
investment are capital assets, and their sale generates only capital
gain or loss. When a taxpayer buys property to assure a source of
supply or a source of income for its business, the property acquired
begins to appear less like an investment and more like an ordinary
business precaution even though it may not be used directly in the
taxpayer's operations. Consequently, it becomes important to deter-
mine the reason for the purchase, and thereby to characterize any
resulting gain or loss. Corn Products is the starting point for such a
determination.
In Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,1 2 the taxpayer
had bought corn futures to protect its business from losses which
would arise when it had to fill contract demands at a price lower
than the cost of corn on a rising market.201 The taxpayer established
that occasionally it made a profit on the sale of the futures when it
did not require delivery on those contracts and sold them instead.
However, the evidence showed that in buying the futures the tax-
payer was interested primarily in protecting its business operations
from an upside risk. By purchasing the futures and taking delivery
on them "as it found necessary to its manufacturing operations"' 1
and selling when no shortage appeared imminent, the company
effectively protected itself against substantial price increases. But
in 1942 Corn Products incurred a $110,000 loss, which it attempted
to treat as a capital loss after reporting it as an ordinary loss.
The Supreme Court recognized that the futures met the liberal
definition of a capital asset, and did not fall within any statutory
202. 350 U.S. 46, 47 A.F.T.R. 1789 (1955).
203. See, e.g., Cunnane, Acquiring Capital Items for Non-Capital Purposes, or When Is
a Capital Asset Not a Capital Asset? in NEw YORK UNIVEmRSy Tw rY-NINTH ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 705 (H. Sellin ed. 1971); Note, Taxpayer Motivation And The
Corn Products Doctrine, 29 TAx LAw. 660 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Taxpayer Motivation].
204. 350 U.S. at 48.
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exception. 205 Nevertheless, the Court held that they were ordinary
assets because they were an integral part of the taxpayer's business.
It noted that the capital asset provisions were exceptions to the
normal income tax rules, and as such must be strictly construed. To
hold otherwise, the Court said, would denigrate the congressional
intention of limiting the special tax treatment accorded to capital
assets only to gains and losses which arise from the sale or exchange
of property outside the stream of daily occurrences.
When the Corn Products doctrine is invoked, the courts must ask
if the taxpayer purchased and held the property with a predominant
business, as opposed to investment, purpose. 2°0 Where a predomi-
nant business purpose is found the taxpayer must recognize a gain
or loss as ordinary.20 7 Conversely, a predominant investment motive
will cause gain or loss to be capital.
It would, of course, be to the taxpayer's advantage to have gains
characterized as capital and losses as ordinary. The lack of stan-
dardized guidelines by which the taxpayer's predominant intent can
205. Id. at 51-52.
206. Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1343, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6251 (Ct. Cl.
1975); Agway, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1194, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6157 (Ct. Cl. 1975);
Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-1520 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Stead-
man v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-926 (6th Cir. 1970); W.W. Windle Co. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43, 39 A.F.T.R.2d 77-783 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977); International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 232 (1974), rev'd & remanded, 524 F.2d 357, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6054 (2d Cir.
1975).
In Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-788 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970), the court applied Corn Products to § 1231. Cf. United
States v. Hess, 341 F.2d 444, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1965) (dictum to the same effect).
See also Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944, 47 A.F.T.R. 790 (2d Cir. 1955),
where the court found that a loss on governmental obligations required to be posted by the
taxpayer as security for the performance of a contract was an ordinary loss. Although the
Service contended that the loss should have been treated as a capital loss because the bonds
were capital assets, the court reasoned that the bonds would not have been acquired by the
taxpayer in the absence of the security requirement in the contract. Therefore, the acquisition
and holding of the bonds was integrally related to the taxpayer's business. Hence, the loss
was ordinary. See Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115, 28
A.F.T.R.2d 71-5019 (5th Cir. 1971); Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845,
24 A.F.T.R.2d 69-5841 (Ct. Cl. 1969); FS Services, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 548, 24
A.F.T.R.2d 69-5180 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 9
A.F.T.R.2d 1693 (Ct. Cl. 1962); International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 232 (1974) rev'd & remanded, 524 F.2d 357, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6054 (2d Cir. 1975);
Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1146 (1955); Western Wine and
Liquor Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1090 (1952). In Estate of Laughlin v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 227 (1971), the taxpayer sought to assert Corn Products to obtain ordinary
loss treatment on soybean futures, but the court found that the futures were purchased for
speculation and not as an integral part of the taxpayer's business.
In determining the taxpayer's intent the Court's decision in Malat, section I.B.3.a., supra,
might be useful.
207. See 350 U.S. at 50-51.
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be determined has led to apparently inconsistent results in appar-
ently consistent settings. To eliminate the ability to contend that
property was a capital asset if gain is realized, but a non-capital
asset if loss is incurred, Congress has considered many proposals.
For example, H.R. 10902, passed by the House of Representatives
on August 25, 1976, would have enacted new section 1254.208 This
provision would have required most taxpayers to notify the Service
that they were holding securities for business reasons within thirty
days after acquiring the securities. Once the taxpayer notified the
Service- that the securities were being held for business purposes
they were to be characterized as non-capital assets. If the taxpayer
did not notify the government, then any gain or loss realized there-
after would be capital gain or loss. The House Ways and Means
Committee Report stated that the new section was intended to pre-
clude the taxpayer from contending that gain was capital and that
loss was ordinary depending on whether the market was up or down.
In addition, the new section was designed to clarify an area in which
each case previously had been categorized by its own facts. The
report specifically cited Union Pacific R.R. v. United States,2 1
W. W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner,211' and Carsello v. Commis-
sioner,21' as examples of this inconsistency.
One of the primary reasons given by the Ways and Means Com-
mittee supporting H.R. 10902 was the lack of standards with which
courts can administer the Corn Products doctrine. In part it is this
absence of guidelines that accounts for the remarkable ability of
taxpayers to argue that losses are ordinary, and that gains are capi-
tal, depending upon the results of a sale. Rarely will a taxpayer
acquire property exclusively for business purposes. Instead, each
business purchase is probably accompanied by a substantial invest-
ment motive. 212 A typical Corn Products hedge against upside risks
will be joined by an anticipation of making a profit in the business
as well as on the disposition of the hedge itself. Thus, the courts are
faced with the task of determining which purpose is predominant
where the transaction is imbued with both business and investment
purposes. 23
208. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Cf. I.R.C. § 1236 (which requires security dealers to label
their acquisitions as held for investment purposes in order to have gain from the sale or
exchange thereof considered capital gain).
209. 524 F.2d 1343, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6251 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
210. 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43, 39 A.F.T.R.2d 77-783 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977).
211. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 832 (1976).
212. See Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 67.
213. Id.
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Balancing motivations is a difficult task, especially in tax cases."
The decisions of the few courts which have been requested to do so
in Corn Products settings are not in agreement."' While most courts
confronting the problem have not adopted the alternative of allocat-
ing the results between capital and ordinary treatment according to
a rough approximation of business and investment purposes, 216 they
also have not agreed on the point at which one purpose clearly leads
to the total characterization of the transaction despite the presence
of a significant, but secondary, contrary motivation. 217 Moreover, no
uniformity has emerged as to the effect of a subsequent change of
purpose in holding the asset, regardless of whether that purpose was
predominant at the time of sale, when the property was acquired
primarily for another reason. For example, property purchased for
business reasons, but subsequently held to the time of sale for in-
vestment purposes, may or may not be treated as a capital asset.2 18
C. Disguised Interest Income
1. Original Issue Discount
Section 1232 was enacted to prevent the transformation of inter-
est income into capital gain through the issuance of corporate or
government bonds and obligations at a price below their stated
redemption price at maturity.219 Original issue discount is defined
214. See generally, Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34
U. CHI. L. REv. 485 (1967); Taxpayer Motivation, supra note 203.
215. Compare Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1343, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6251
(Ct. Cl. 1975) with Agway, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1194, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6157 (Ct.
Cl. 1975) and Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-1520 (Ct. Cl.
1971).
216. Allocations are used in a number of instances in the Code. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 167,
183, 274, 482, 631(a), 1237; Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 37
A.F.T.R.2d 76-679 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1977) (rejecting such allocations
under § 1221(1)); cf. Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 220, 46 A.F.T.R. 1444 (5th
Cir. 1954) (gain from sale of 102 houses over a fourteen month period held to be ordinary gain
as the property was held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business). See generally
ALI, Draft of a Study of Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation § X1237, at 32-34,
81-84 (Apr. 22, 1960).
217. See generally Missisquoi Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 791, 797-98 (1962); Cun-
nane, supra note 203; Taxpayer Motivation, supra note 203.
218. See sources cited id. See also W.W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1976);
International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 232 (1974), rev'd &
remanded, 524 F.2d 357, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6054 (2d Cir. 1975); Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B.
67.
219. See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp. 381 U.S. 54, 57, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 836 (1965);
Helvering v. Union Pac. R.R., 293 U.S. 282, 14 A.F.T.R. 705 (1934); General Foods Corp. v.
United States, 530 F.2d 923, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-706 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867
(1977); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5847 (Ct. Cl. 1974), rev'd in
part, 530 F.2d 1367, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-696 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1977);
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by section 1232(b)(1) as the difference between the issue price and
the face value, or "stated redemption price," of the bond or obliga-
tion at maturity. Gain attributable to the discount is characterized
as ordinary income because it "is a form of interest income [which]
in fact is deductible as an interest payment by the issu[er]
.... "220 Sales or exchanges of evidences of indebtedness are capi-
tal transactions, provided that the obligation is a capital asset in the
hands of the taxpayer.22' From this treatment Congress carved out
certain exceptions, including gain attributable to original issue dis-
count. Subject to a de minimis principle, such gain is taxed as gain
from the sale of a non-capital asset, regardless of whether the obliga-
tion is sold or redeemed.22 1 If the original purchaser holds the obliga-
tion to maturity, the entire amount of the discount is ordinary in-
come. But if the obligation is sold or redeemed prior to maturity,
only that portion of the discount accrued up to the date of the sale
or redemption is taxed as ordinary income r3
In United States v. Midland-Ross Corp. ,224 the Supreme Court
considered what characterization should be accorded to non-
interest bearing promissory notes originally issued at a discount.
Although the taxpayer had reported the gain as capital gain under
section 117 of the 1939 Code, he conceded that any gain attributable
to the discount was not caused by market fluctuations, but by the
economic equivalent of interest: the simple passage of time.225 The
Court ruled in favor of the government, premising its decision on the
traditionally narrow construction given the term "capital asset." It
explained that:
Although original issue discount becomes property when the obli-
gation falls due or is liquidated prior to maturity and [§ 1221]
define[s] a capital asset as "property held by the taxpayer," we
have held that
"not everything which can be called property in the ordinary
sense . . . qualifies as a capital asset. .. ."
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Seas. A275, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4017, 4110; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 433 reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4745. See generally, Landis, Original Issue Discount After the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, 24 TAx LAw. 435 (1971); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, Comm. on
Corporate Taxation, Comments on Proposed and Final Regulations on Income Tax Treat-
ment of Corporate Debt Issued at Discount, 50 TAXEs 274 (1972).
220. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Seas., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4017, 4110.
221. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-1(a) (1978).
222. Id.; I.R.C. § 1232(b)(1).
223. See I.R.C. § 1232(a)(2).
224. 381 U.S. 54, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 836 (1965).
225. Id. at 55-56, 55 n.1.
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[Tihis court has consistently construed "capital asset" to exclude
property representing income items or accretions to the value of a
.capital asset themselves properly attributable to income ...
Similarly, earned original issue discount cannot be regarded as
"typically involving the realization of appreciation in value ac-
crued over a substantial period of time . . .[given capital gains
treatment] to ameliorate the hardship of taxation of the entire
gain in one year."
Earned original issue discount serves the same function as stated
interest, concededly ordinary income and not a capital asset; it is
simply "compensation for the use or forbearance of money.' '22
In Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling
Co., 127 the Court focused on the narrow question of whether a dis-
count may result when debt obligations are issued in exchange for
property other than cash. The corporation had issued fifty dollar
(face value), five percent bonds for its equally-valued outstanding
preferred stock. At the time of the exchange, however, the stock had
a market value one-third less than its face value. The corporation
therefore claimed that since the stockholders in effect had been
issued bonds at a discount, it was entitled to an interest deduction.
The Court held that no discount resulted where the corporation
issued its obligations (debenture bonds) in exchange for its own
outstanding preferred shares. 5
The original issue discount element of section 1232 obligations
must be taken into income ratably over the holding period of the
indebtedness.2 29 As the discount element is included in income,
there is a corresponding basis increase.23 These rules thus attempt
to create parallel tax treatment for the holder of the obligation and
the issuer, for the issuer may deduct the amount of the discount
ratably over the life of the obligation .231
If the obligation was intended to be called prior to maturity, the
gain is ordinary income less any previously recognized part of the
226. Id. at 56-57 (quoting Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Co., 364 U.S. 130, 134, 5
A.F.T.R.2d 1770 (1960), and Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 498, 23 A.F.T.R. 808 (1940)).
See also Pattiz v. United States, 311 F.2d 947, 11 A.F.T.R.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
227. 417 U.S. 134, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-1347 (1974).
228. Id. at 155. The Court reasoned that although the form of retained capital had been
changed, the corporation had not incurred any additional costs for borrowing money, and
hence an interest deduction would be improper. Id. at 154. See Wolf, Original Issue Dis-
count: Before and After National Alfalfa, 28 TAX LAW. 325 (1975).
229. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3)(A).
230. Id. § 1232 (a)(3)(E).
231. Section 1232 pre-empts § 483 in this regard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(3) (1978).
In applying § 453, original issue discount is excluded from both the selling and the contract
prices. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.453-1(b)(3); 1.1232-3(b)(2)(iii) (1978).
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discount."2 Where the discounted instrument is purchased from the
initial holder, the purchaser is treated the same as the seller unless
the obligation is purchased at a premium. However, the purchaser
may deduct any cost in excess of the prior owner's adjusted basis
ratably over the obligation's remaining life.133
Original issue discount generally will not arise where the obliga-
tion is issued for property other than cash,134 in a reorganization,2 35
or as a result of a basis reduction due to Subchapter S losses. 1e In
addition, section 1232 does not apply to savings accounts, 3 7 or to tax
exempt obligations under section 103.238 The Regulations, however,
have applied section 1232 to certificates of deposit, time deposits,
and various other deposit plans offered by financial institutions.2 39
Special rules apply to determining the discount factor where bonds
and warrants are issued together.240
2. Imputed Interest
Congress enacted section 483 in 196421 "to prohibit a seller from
avoiding ordinary income liability by merely labeling receipts as
selling price rather than interest . . 22 Under section 483 a por-
tion of each payment under a deferred payment sales contract may
232. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(2)(A).
233. See I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3).
234. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(iii) (1978). See also National Alfalfa Dehydrating &
Milling Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 134.
235. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(iii) (1978) (applying the general rule to I.R.C. §§ 361,
371, 373, and 374, but not to § 351); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(1)(iv) (1978) (original issue
discount "taint" is retained in a reorganization).
236. Compare Rev. Rul. 64-162, 1964-1 C.B. 304 with Rev. Rul. 68-537, 1968-2 C.B. 372.
237. See Dwyer v. United States, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-924 (N.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Cato v. United States, 442 F.2d 927, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-1236 (5th Cir. 1971).
238. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(2)(C)(i).
239. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3A(e) (1978).
240. I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2).
241. See Shanahan v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 3, 26 A.F.T.R.2d 70-5785 (D. Colo.
1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1082, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5544 (10th Cir. 1971), regarding the retroactive
application of § 483.
242. Robinson v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 767, 768, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-970 (8th Cir. 1971);
see H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 196-98 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 605-08 (1964). Prior to the enactment of § 483, the entire amount was treated as the
purchase price. See Paine v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 398, 50 A.F.T.R. 10 (8th Cir. 1956);
Kingsford Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 646 (1964).
Under § 483(f)(4), the general rule of § 483(a) may not be applicable in the case of a transfer
of a patent. See Busse v. United States, 543 F.2d 1321, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5984 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
cf. I.R.C. § 163(b) (which allows an interest deduction for unstated interest on personal
property bought on the installment plan). See generally Bonovitz, Problems of Imputed
Interest in Installment Sales of a Corporate Business, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWE'NTY-
SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 821 (H. Sellin ed. 1969); Murdoch, Imputed
Interest and Section 483, 44 TAxEs 866 (1966); Thorington & Hardegree, Imputed Interest-A
Potential Tax Trap, 54 A.B.A.J. 808 (1968).
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be treated as interest, rather than as part of the sales price, if the
contract does not provide for interest, or provides for interest below
the rate prescribed by the Treasury. Section 483 applies to any
payment on account of the sale or exchange of property, provided
that (1) the selling price is more than $3,000,243 (2) the payment is
part or all of the sales price, (3) the payment is due, under the
contract, more than six months after the date of the sale or ex-
change, (4) one or more payments are due more than one year after
the date of the sale or exchange, and (5) under the terms of the
contract, there is "total unstated interest" as defined in section
483(b).24 Section 483(d) contains a separate rule for imputing inter-
est where the payments are indefinite as to time, liability, or
amount.2 1
Section 483 is explicitly designed to prevent a seller from receiv-
ing interest income taxed at capital gains rates by increasing the
total deferred amount of the sales price to reflect the unstated inter-
est. Where a portion of each payment represents ordinary interest
income, section 483 operates to preclude the seller from converting
the interest into capital gains by not specifying interest in the obli-
gation. 26
The imputation of interest under section 483 may disqualify an
installment sale from the favorable treatment accorded by section
453.247 This would occur if, pursuant to section 483, the selling price
is reduced to reflect the unstated interest to the point that the down
payment exceeds thirty percent of the adjusted selling price in the
year of the sale. 4'
D. Section 1231
Section 1221(2) excludes from the definition of a capital asset
"property, used in [the taxpayer's] trade or business, of a character
which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in sec-
tion 167, or real property used in his trade or business ....
Nevertheless, while section 1221(2) removes these noninventory
243. I.R.C. § 483(f)(1).
244. I.R.C. § 483(c). "Total unstated interest" means "an amount equal to the excess of
(1) the sum of the payments to which [§ 483] applies which are due under the contract, over
(2) the sum of the present values of such payments and the present values of any interest
payments due under the contract." I.R.C. § 483(b).
245. I.R.C. § 483(d); see Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 578 n.9, 15 A.F.T.R.2d
790 (1965); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1673, 1776.
246. I.R.C. § 483.
247. Robinson v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 767, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-970 (8th Cir. 1971).
248. Id. See I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(B).
249. I.R.C. § 1221(2); see section I.C. supra.
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business assets from the category of capital assets, section 1231 may
treat gain on their disposition as gain from the sale or exchange of
a capital asset.2 15 Because of this intimate relationship between sec-
tions 1221(2) and 1231, neither provision can be fully understood
without reference to the other. Hence, the section 1221(2) exclusion
must be considered with regard to section 1231, which, again, may
characterize gain from the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion
of these non-capital assets as capital gain.
Properties covered by section 1231, which must have been held for
more than one year,251 are often referred to as "quasi capital assets"
because section 1231 provides for capital gain treatment of certain
non-capital assets if these assets are disposed of at a net gain, while
it allows ordinary loss treatment if they are sold, exchanged, or
involuntarily converted at a net loss. 252 The determination of
whether to use capital or ordinary treatment is accomplished by a
comparison of the total recognized gain on the disposition of section
1231 property with the sum of the otherwise allowable losses on the
same items. If the total of the individually computed gains exceeds
the total of the losses on the same property, all gains and all losses
are capital gains and losses. Conversely, if the losses equal or exceed
the gains, all gains and all losses are ordinary gains and losses.
Section 1231 applies to depreciable property and to real property,
provided that each is used in the taxpayer's trade or business. 2 3 It
excludes inventory, stock in trade, and property held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or
business, as well as property included in section 1221(3).214 In addi-
tion, section 1231(b)(2)-(4) includes cut timber, coal, iron ore, tim-
ber royalties, certain livestock, and unharvested crops-all of which
are non-capital assets and closely related to inventory property. In
some instances section 1231 may include the proceeds from the
involuntary conversion of capital assets. 5 This is the only exception
to the rule that section 1231 does not involve capital assets.
Section 1231 requires two separate comparisons of gains and
250. See I.R.C. § 1231.
251. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(1). Special time rules are provided in the cases of livestock, miner-
als, and unharvested crops sold with the land. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(2)-(4).
252. I.R.C. § 1231(a). The existence of the involuntary conversion category, of course,
removes the necessity of having a sale or exchange. See Part Two, supra note 2 at III.A.; cf.
Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 25 A.F.T.R. 1236 (1941) (money
received by taxpayer as proceeds of insurance on buildings and equipment destroyed by fire
held not a gain from "sale or exchange" of capital assets).
253. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(1).
254. Id. § (b)(1)(A)&(B).
255. Section 1231(a) covers involuntary and compulsory conversions as well as voluntary
ones.
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losses on the disposition of certain categories of property. 25 The first
level, sometimes referred to as the "firepot," involves only gains and
losses from the involuntary conversion of (1) depreciable and real
property which is used in the taxpayer's trade or business, and (2)
capital assets held for more than one year.2 57 Involuntary conver-
sions are those events defined in section 165(c) (3).2 If the compari-
son of these gains and losses shows that the losses exceed the gains,
then section 1231 is inapplicable and the transactions are character-
ized by the otherwise applicable Code provisions."9 However, if the
gains equal or exceed the losses, then the full amount of the gains
and losses enters the second comparison.
The second process of comparison under section 1231 generally is
referred to as the "hotchpot. ' '160 It begins by carrying over the recog-
nized gains and losses from the involuntary conversions compared
on the first level, but only where those gains equal or exceed those
losses. To these items are added the gains and losses from compul-
sory conversions (such as condemnations) of property used in the
taxpayer's trade or business and capital assets held for more than
one year, plus gains and losses from the sale or exchange of property
used in the taxpayer's trade or business. Thus, there should be three
categories of gains and losses present in section 1231's hotchpot: (1)
gains and losses from the involuntary conversions (the subject of the
first comparison); (2) gains and losses from the compulsory conver-
sion of (a) property used in the taxpayer's trade or business, and (b)
capital assets held for more than one year; and (3) gains and losses
from the sale or exchange of property used in the taxpayer's trade
or business. 261
This second comparison merely requires that the total of all the
gains be determined and then compared with the total losses. If the
total gains exceed the total losses, all of the gains and all of the
losses in the comparison are considered to be capital gains and
capital losses. Conversely, if the gross loss equals or exceeds the
256. See I.R.C. § 1231(a).
257. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(b) (1978) (note that the Regulation has not yet been
amended to reflect the holding period change from six months to one year). Naturally, all
the gains and losses must be recognized. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 removed any necessity
to consider whether the assets used in gain seeking were insured. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 516(b),
83 Stat. 487 (1969). See also H.R. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 319 (1969).
258. They are "fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or ... theft." I.R.C. § 165(c)(3).
See also id. § 1231(a).
259. See § 165(a) (losses arising from property used in taxpayer's trade or business); §
165(c)(3) (losses arising from certain involuntary conversions). These sections still guarantee
ordinary loss treatment where § 1231 otherwise would apply.
260. See Birkeland, Section 1231: A Fading Star for the Business Taxpayer, 60 A.B.A.J.
845 (1974); Lee, Section 1231 Gains and Losses, 21 (No. 6) PRAc. LAw. 25 (1975).
261. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(g) (1978).
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gross gain, all of the gains and all of the losses are treated as ordi-
nary gains and losses.12 Note well: the gains and losses are not
netted.
Once the second comparison is completed, all of the gains and all
of the losses compared enter into the calculation of the taxpayer's
income, characterized as capital or ordinary, according to the pro-
cess described above. Thus, all of the gains and losses compared
under section 1231 are aggregated with other items of the same
character in the taxpayer's return which were not subject to section
1231. For example, if the section 1231 comparison shows that the
gains exceed the losses, then all of those gains and all of those losses
are treated as capital gains and losses and must be added to the
taxpayer's "real" capital gains and losses.263 Similarly, if the com-
parison shows an amount of losses equal to or in excess of the gains
compared, thereby treating all of the items as ordinary, the gains
and losses from the hotchpot must be added to the taxpayer's ordi-
nary gains and losses. 24
If the taxpayer has only one section 1231 event during the taxable
year, it, too, is characterized by section 1231. '25 As a result, gain on
the sale of non-inventory business property-an admittedly non-
capital item-will be treated as a capital gain if that is the tax-
payer's only section 1231 transaction for the year. On the other
hand, if the compulsory conversion of a capital asset held for more
than one year results in a loss, and the conversion is the taxpayer's
only section 1231 event, the loss is ordinary rather than capital.2 6
The gains and losses to which section 1231 applies must be recog-
nized and otherwise subject to inclusion in the computation of gross
income.267 Thus, nondeductible losses are excluded, as are gains and
losses from nontaxable exchanges.2 8 The section 1211 restrictions on
the deductibility of capital losses are disregarded for purposes of
making the section 1231 comparison,2 ' 9 but the limitations on the
current recognition of gain on the sale of property reported on the
installment method are observed. 0
Any gain on the disposition of section 1231 property that is sub-
ject to recapture is excluded from the section 1231 process, and is
262. I.R.C. § 1231(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(b)(2) (1978). It is probably more accurate to
view the § 1231 mechanics as a comparative rather than a netting process.
263. Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(b)(2) (1978).
264. Id.
265. Id. § 1.1231-1(a) (1978).
266. Id.
267. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1).
268. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(d)(1), (4) (1978).
269. Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(d) (1978).
270. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(d)(3) (1978).
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taxed as ordinary income under the usual rules applicable to recap-
ture property.Y However, any gain in excess of the amount subject
to recapture is taken into account under section 1231, as are losses
on the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of property that
otherwise would be subject to recapture, and which is within the
ambit of section 1231. 2
In determining whether, for purposes of section 1231, property is
used in the taxpayer's trade or business, as distinguished from being
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of that
trade or business, the interpretations of section 1221(1) and (2) are
useful but not necessarily dispositive. Although the same language
is used in both sections, the exclusions from section 1221 are
broader, in the sense that they do not have to be construed strictly,
than the exclusions from section 1231. For example, a court can
decide that specific property is not a capital asset because it either
is used in the taxpayer's trade or business or is held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of that business. In the
former instance the property is excluded by section 1221(1), and in
the latter by section 1221(2). In either case the property simply is
not a capital asset. However, such a determination is insufficient
under section 1231. That section encompasses gains and losses from
the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of property used in the
taxpayer's trade or business, but excludes property that is held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of thai busi-
ness. Thus, for purposes of ascertaining whether an item is a capital
asset, it makes no difference which label is applied, or even if it is
clear that the exact nature of the property was not determined. But
for purposes of deciding whether an item will be treated as a capital
asset under section 1231 the difference is crucial. For example, in
International Shoe Machine Corp. v. United States, 2 3 the court
clearly removed the property from capital asset classification. How-
ever, the exclusion of the shoe manufacturing equipment involved
turned on its categorization as being held primarily for sale in the
ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business, even though only
a small percentage of the taxpayer's revenues was from the sale of
shoe manufacturing equipment.24 Had the court decided instead
that the equipment was used in the taxpayer's business, the sales
would have been included under section 1231.
271. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(a); 1.1250-1(c)(1) (1978).
272. Id.
273. 491 F.2d 157, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-619 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1975).
274. Id. The taxpayer preferred to lease the equipment but would sell "as a last resort."
Id. at 160.
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In contrast, the Corn Products doctrine 75 applies equally to both
section 1221 and section 1231.75 Yet when section 1231's applicabil-
ity is in question, the courts seem to give Corn Products a more
expansive reading, thereby broadening the types of property com-
pletely excluded from capital asset treatment. 77 The reason for this
interpretation under section 1231 probably can be explained in
terms of the difficulty encountered in drawing the fine lines required
by section 1231(b), and by the fact that property susceptible to the
Corn Products doctrine is not likely to exhibit the latent investment
qualities that otherwise support the existence of section 1231.2 8
Section 1231 generally is favorable to the taxpayer since it makes
available the best of both worlds-capital gain and ordinary loss.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the section is not construed in a
broadly remedial manner.
E. Options to Buy or Sell
Section 1234 provides that "[glain or loss attributable to the sale
or exchange of, or loss attributable to failure to exercise, an option
to buy or sell . . ." stock, securities, or commodities shall be consid-
ered to be of the same character as the property to which the option
relates.27 Section 1234 does not apply to any option which is granted
in the ordinary course of the grantor's business of granting op-
tions,280 nor does it apply to an option which otherwise is described
in section 1221(1), or to a loss covered by section 1233(c). 28 Section
1234 is, however, applicable to puts, calls, and various other securi-
ties devices.2 2
275. See section II.B. supra.
276. See, e.g., Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494, 25 A.F.T.R.2d
70-788 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970). But see Deltide Fishing & Rentals
Tools v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 21 A.F.T.R.2d 470 (E.D. La. 1968).
277. By definition, almost all § 1231 property is excluded from § 1221. Therefore, if it is
excluded from § 1231 as well, it is removed entirely from any capital asset consideration. In
Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-788 (9th Cir.
1970), the court reasoned that the contracts in question were the business property of the
taxpayer, in .the sense that they were related integrally to its business, and that the capital
gain policy of according special tax treatment to gain that arises outside the routine opera-
tions of a business would be thwarted if § 1231 converted ordinary income into capital gain.
However, few courts have followed the Ninth Circuit. See 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 609 (1971).
278. See 23 U. FiA. L. Rv. 609 (1971).
279. I.R.C. § 1234(a)(1). See also, H.R. REP. No. 1192, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Estes,
Federal Income Tax Advantages to Investors in the Use of Put and Call Options, 31 TAx L.
REV. 1 (1975); Gallagher & Tarkoe, Taxing an Option on American Business: Puts, Calls and
the IRC, 52 TAXEs 481 (1974).
280. I.R.C. § 1234(b)(3).
281. Id. § 1234(a)(3).
282. Id. § 1234 (a), (b).
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F. Gain on Sales or Exchanges Between Related Parties
1. In General
Transfers of depreciable property between related parties have
caused a significant number of tax problems for the parties involved
and for the government. Related party transfers may facilitate the
shifting of income without engendering a detrimental change in the
pecuniary situation of the economic unit.28 3 Frequently the goal of
such transfers is the enhancement of the parties' overall financial
picture through a splitting of income and an accompanying decrease
in taxes. Moreover, regardless of whether the property is income-
producing, its conveyance may reduce the size of the transferor's
taxable estate, effectively shift or create deductible expenses, or
both. 28 14 This may have the same result as income splitting. Although
losses generally cannot be transferred between related parties, if the
property is depreciable, the allure of potential tax benefits incident
to such a transfer may be irresistible. 285
For example, assume that A owns Blackacre, a depreciable struc-
ture with a fair market value in excess of A's adjusted basis. During
the term of his ownership A has depreciated Blackacre in accor-
dance with section 167, thereby offsetting otherwise taxable ordi-
nary income. Since Blackacre's value exceeds A's basis, A would
like to be able to take depreciation deductions based on the greater
value. He is not permitted to do so, however, because depreciation
is derived from the owner's adjusted basis in his property. 286 There-
fore, A decides to sell Blackacre to B, a related party, so that B can
depreciate the property based on his cost, its increased value. The
difference between A's adjusted basis and the sales price will be
taxed at capital gains rates.2 8 Consequently, A and B anticipate
283. See generally, Croft & Hipple, Planning Lifetime Property Transfers: Private Annui-
ties, Installment Sales and Gift-Leasebacks, 11 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 253 (1976); First,
Transactions Between Related Taxpayers- Constructive Stock Ownership Rules and
Applications, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SIXTEENTH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 801 (1958);
Gallagher, Gain on Sales or Exchanges Between Related Parties, 1 REv. TAX. INDIVIDUALS 136
(1977); Ginsburg, Real Estate Transactions Between Related Taxpayers, in NEW YORK UNI-
vERsrry TwEtrY-SixTH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 311 (1968); Hamovit, Disallowances
of Losses and Deductions and Characterization of Gains Between Related Persons, 15 W. REs.
L. REv. 270 (1964).
284. When the transfer involves a sale and leaseback, however, the courts have been
reluctant to recognize the transfer as bona fide. See generally Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
285. I.R.C. § 267; see First, supra note 267, at 801-05; Hamovit, supra note 267.
286. I.R.C. § 167(g); see Gallagher, Fiscal Alchemy and the Crane Rule: Alternative
Solutions to the Tax Shelter, 8 CONN. L. REV. 607 (1976).
287. However, the gain on the sale of the property probably will be subject to the recap-
ture rules of I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 to the extent that A's depreciation exceeded straight line.
Naturally, if the transfer is a gift, the donee will carry over A's basis.
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receiving greater depreciation deductions, to offset ordinary income,
at a cost of a capital gains tax on the gain realized by A. This cost
is partially represented in the downward basis adjustments caused
by A's depreciation of the property. In the absence of a tightly
drafted statute designed to prevent this result, the A-B transaction
very well might be effective."' 8 In fact, depending on the relationship
of the parties and the manner in which the transfer was effected,
this often happened notwithstanding the existence of section 1239.
2. Section 1239
As originally enacted, section 1239 denied capital gains treatment
on gain from the sale or exchange of depreciable property between
husband and wife, or between an individual and a corporation in
which the individual, his spouse, and his minor children and grand-
children owned over eighty percent of the value of the stock." The
section was designed to prevent taxpayers from selling depreciable
property with a market value greater than basis to relatives in order
to obtain increased depreciation deductions at the cost of a capital
gains tax.290 The House Report explained that:
The substantial differential between the capital-gains rate and the
ordinary rates makes such a substitution highly advantageous
when the sale may be carried out without loss of control over the
asset because the corporation to which the asset is sold is con-
trolled by the individuals who make the sale."9 '
Some courts, however, in apparent contradiction to the legislative
design, have held that section 1239 did not apply to gain from the
sale of depreciable property between two corporations controlled by
the same taxpayer or his family. 92 Moreover, in Mitchell v.
288. See Mitchell v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 533, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1962), dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 293-97. See generally Reilly, An Approach to the
Simplification and Standardization of the Concepts "The Family," "Related Parties,"
"Control," and "Attribution of Ownership," 15 TAX L. Rav. 253 (1960); see also Childers v.
United States, 542 F.2d 1243, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-6002 (4th Cir. 1976).
289. Section 1239's predecessor was enacted by § 310(a) of the Revenue Act of 1951 as §
117(o) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. See H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951),
reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 357, 376; S. Rae. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), reprinted in
1951-2 C.B. 458, 507; CONF; REP. No. 1213, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19511 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2121, 2135. The Service has ruled that the "value" of the stock
referred to in I.R.C. § 1239 is not necessarily the same as 80% or more of the total number of
shares outstanding. Rev. Rul. 69-339, 1969-1 C.B. 203.
290. Note § 1239's nonapplicability to patent transfers: Davis v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d
709, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-671 (6th Cir. 1974); Chu v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 696, 32 A.F.T.R.2d
73-6022 (lst Cir. 1973).
291. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 357, 376.
292. See Miller v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 230, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-714 (9th Cir. 1975); 10-
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Commissioner, 9 3 the court held that section 1239 did not apply
where stock was held in trust for the benefit of the taxpayer's minor
children. The taxpayer in Mitchell transferred a number of shares
to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children. The corpora-
tion whose shares were transferred purchased a building for $167,500
and sold it to the taxpayer for the same price one month later. Four
years later the taxpayer sold the property back to the corporation
for $199,500. Since his adjusted basis at that time was approxi-
mately $154,000, he reported a long term capital gain of almost
$45,600.
The taxpayer, his wife, and two of his minor children owned
79.54% of the corporation's outstanding stock at the time of the
reconveyance. Additionally, the two minor children were beneficia-
ries of 12.21% of the stock. (The taxpayer's oldest child, an adult,
and thus irrelevant here, owned the remainder of the stock.) Thus
the taxpayer, his wife, and his minor children together owned over
90% of the stock: well above the 80% threshold.
The Commissioner asserted a deficiency, and the taxpayer peti-
tioned the Tax Court for relief. The Service contended that the
entrusted shares were owned by the taxpayer's minor children
within the meaning of section 1239(b)(2), relying specifically upon
Treasury Regulation section 1.1239-1, which expressly included the
beneficial ownership of stock within the ambit of section 1239. By
the authority of the Regulation, the Tax Court found that the eighty
percent threshold had been exceeded and held against the peti-
tioner.
The Tax Court's decision, however, was reversed on appeal. The
Fourth Circuit examined the legislative history of section 1239 and
concluded that neither entrusted shares nor those owned by adult
children were intended by Congress to be attributed to the taxpayer.
The court emphasized that the original House version of section
1239 had provided specifically that "stock owned, directly or indi-
rectly, by or for a . . .trust, shall be considered as being owned
proportionately by or for its . . . beneficiaries. 294 Under certain
42 Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 593 (1971), rejecting Rev. Rul. 69-109, 1969-1 C.B. 202
(section 1239 encompasses commonly controlled corporations). In the Supplemental Report
of the Senate Finance Committee on Amendments to H.R. 10612, the Committee explained
that transfers between commonly controlled corporations should have been found to be in-
cluded under I.R.C. § 1239. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Supp. Comm. Rep. 1976),
1976-3 C.B. 643, 671. See generally, Ellis, Tax Problems in Sales to Controlled Corporations,
21 V D. L. REv. 196 (1968).
293. 300 F.2d 533, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1962).
294. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19511 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1781, 1909, quoted in Mitchell v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 533, 536, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 954
(4th Cir. 1962).
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circumstances the House bill would have attributed stock owned by
designated relatives, including children, to the taxpayer."5 The
Conference Committee, however, followed the Senate version, and
deleted these provisions on the ground that they would impede
transfers of depreciable property even when tax avoidance was not
the motive."'6 Threfore, due to "the design of the section as re-
vealed by its structure and history," '97 the court concluded that
the instant transfer was outside the purview of section 1239 not-
withstanding the Treasury's interpretation to the contrary.
Like the beneficial ownership issue considered in Mitchell, the
question of whether shares which are subject to an option or similar
contract held by the taxpayer should be attributed to him for pur-
poses of triggering the more than eighty percent test has been re-
solved inconsistently.28 For example, in United States v. Parker,"'
the court applied section 1239 to deny capital gains treatment to
an eighty percent shareholder who sold a building to the corpora-
tion. Pursuant to a shareholder's agreement, the taxpayer had an
option to purchase the shares of the twenty percent owner in the
event that the latter terminated his employment with the corpo-
ration. The taxpayer's stock was unrestricted, but the corporate
articles gave the corporation a right of first refusal to the twenty
percent owner's shares. Because of this restriction, the court con-
cluded that the value of the taxpayer's eighty percent interest ex-
ceeded the eighty percent threshold.3 0 Section 1239 therefore, re-
quired that the gain be taxed as ordinary.30 '
Conversely, in Trotz v. Commissioner,0 2 the Tax Court refused to
attribute any additional value to an option to purchase the interest
of a minority shareholder. The seventy-nine percent shareholder
had an option to acquire the twenty-one percent owner's interest if
the latter's employment terminated, an action the majority share-
holder could effectuate at will. The Tax Court found that nothing
295. H.R. REP. No. 586, supra note 294.
296. CONF. REP. No. 1213, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19511 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2121, 2135.
297. 300 F.2d at 538.
298. Compare United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1967)
with Trotz v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 927, 17 A.F.T.R.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1966).
299. 376 F.2d 402, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1967).
300. According to the Service the taxpayer actually may own, or be deemed to own, less
than 80% of the total number of corporate shares and yet own more than 80% of the value of
the corporation's stock. Rev. Rul. 69-339, 1969-1 C.B. 203. See also Note, Determination of
Related Parties: A Critical Discussion of the Value Test Prescribed in the Internal Revenue
Code, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 171 (1967).
301. 376 F.2d at 410.
302. 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 687 (1967), on remand from Trotz v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 927,
17 A.F.T.R.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1966).
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was added to the value of the seventy-nine percent interest by the
existence of the option, or by the fact of control, since the company
had no going-concern value. The court reasoned that because a
purchaser would be willing to pay only for the corporation's assets,
the taxpayer owned only seventy-nine percent of the value of the
company's stock.103
As a result of decisions like these, and of the gaps in section 1239's
applicability, taxpayers frequently could avoid its disadvantages
and obtain a stepped-up basis at the cost of a capital gains tax.
The 1976 Act amended section 1239 in an attempt to give it a
more effective and expansive reach. 304 Section 1239 still applies to
the direct or indirect sale or exchange of depreciable property be-
tween related persons °.30 However, section 1239(b) expands the term
"related persons" to include (1) a corporation and an individual who
owns, directly or indirectly, eighty percent or more in value of that
corporation's outstanding stock, and (2) two or more corporations
where the same person, directly or indirectly, owns eighty percent
or more in value of the outstanding shares of each corporation.30 1
Section 1239(b)(1) continues to include spouses as "related per-
sons."3 7
a. Constructive Ownership Rules
Although section 1239 no longer mentions minor children or
grandchildren directly, subsection (c) incorporates the constructive
ownership rules of section 318.301 Under section 318 an individual is
treated as owning stock which is owned, directly or indirectly, by
or for his spouse, parents, children, and grandchildren. Sections
303. 36 T.C.M. (P-H) at 690-91.
304. The amended version of I.R.C. § 1239 originated as § 2303 of the Senate Finance
Committee's amendments to H.R. 10612. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (Supp.
Rep. of Comm. on Finance 1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 643, 670; H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1976). Section 2303, by concurrent resolution of Congress was redesig-
nated as § 2129 of H.R. 10612, the Tax Reform Act of 1976. H.R. Con. Res. 751, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1976).
305. I.R.C. § 1239(a).
306. In Deyoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904 (1976), the court refused to apply the "family
hostility" doctrine to § 1239. Cf. Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 35 A.F.T.R.2d
75-650 (lst Cir. 1975) (family hostility may be considered).
307. The question of whether there has been an interspousal transfer of property within
the meaning of § 1239 requires an initial determination of whether the parties are spouses.
This is a question of local law. See Deyoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904 (1976) in which §
1239 was applied to a property settlement incident to a divorce because the transfer was found
to have occurred prior to the divorce. Section 318(a)(1) eliminates some of the problems in
determining who are within the category of spouses by removing parties who are legally
separated under a court decree. See also Gallagher, supra note 283.
308. See generally Jetter, Katcher & Levine, Constructive Ownership Rules Under
Section 318, TAx MNGM'T (BNA) § 72-3d (1975).
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318(a)(2) and (3) establish attribution rules for partnerships, es-
tates, trusts, and corporations in which the taxpayer or his relatives
hold interests. Additionally, section 318(a)(4) provides that stock
which is subject to an option held by the taxpayer is considered to
be owned by him. Essentially, section 318 authorizes three types of
attribution: (1) between family members (collateral attribution);
(2) from an entity to a person beneficially interested in it (vertical,
or direct attribution) or vice versa (back attribution); and (3) from
an entity to its interested parties to the interested parties' family
members, or from family members to interested parties to the entity
(reattribution) . Section 318(a)(5)(C) prohibits sidewise attribu-
tion: from an interested party to the entity, and from the entity to
another interested party. I°
i. Family Attribution Rules
Section 318(a)(1) provides that an individual constructively owns
the shares owned by his spouse, children, grandchildren, and par-
ents. It does not attribute stock ownership between siblings, nor
does it differentiate minor from adult children or grandchildren."'1
By application of section 318(a)(5)(B), stock constructively owned
section 318(a)(1) cannot thereby be constructively reattributed to
another under this latter section .3 Under section 318(a)(1)(A)(i),
the interspousal attribution rule does not apply where the spouses
are legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate mainte-
nance.
3 13
ii. Trust Attribution Rules
Section 318(a) (2)(B) provides for attribution between a trust and
its beneficiaries. Stock which is owned by the trust is deemed to be
owned by its beneficiaries in proportion to their respective actuarial
interests in the trust.3 t' These interests are determined in accord-
ance with the estate tax regulations. 15 Thus, if X, Y, and Z each
309. Id.; B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 9.21 at 9-11 (3d ed. 1971).
310. See Treas. Reg. § 1.318-4; S. REt. No. 1240, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in
1964-2 C.B. 701, 705.
311. Prior to amendment, § 1239 distinguished between minor and adult children. See
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 533, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1962).
312. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(B).
313. Section 1239 never made this distinction, and only does so as amended by reference
to § 318. See also Deyoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904 (1976) (section 1239 applies to property
divisions incident to a divorce where the division occurs prior to the effective date of the
decree).
314. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(b); see Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7.
315. See id. § 20.2031-7.
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have a one-third interest in a trust which owns ninety shares of
corporation A, each beneficiary will be considered to own thirty
shares of A. In Mitchell v. Commissioner, this rule would have re-
sulted in the disallowance of capital gains treatment on the sale
from the taxpayer to the corporation, even without regard to the
shares owned by or for the taxpayer's adult child." The taxpayer,
his spouse, and his two minor children owned 91.75% of the corpora-
tion. The spouse's shares would be attributable to him under section
318(a)(1)(A)(i), and the trust's shares would be attributable to his
minor children under section 318(a)(2)(B)(i) and to him under sec-
tion 318(a)(1)(A)(ii). Consequently, he would have exceeded the
eighty percent limit of old section 1239.
So long as the beneficiary has more than a "remote contingent
interest" in the trust, section 318(a)(3)(B) requires that the shares
owned by the beneficiary be considered as though they were owned
by the trust. A contingent interest is remote if its maximum ac-
tuarial value is five percent or less of the value of the trust corpus.
To calculate the value of a contingent interest, section
318(a)(3)(B)(i) establishes a presumption that the trustee will exer-
cise the maximum degree of discretion possible in favor of the bene-
ficiary.
In the case of grantor trusts, section 318(a)(2)(B)(ii) attributes
the shares owned by the trust, or the portion of the trust which is
considered to be owned by the taxpayer, to the grantor. Similarly,
section 318(a)(3)(B)(ii) requires a "back" attribution from the
grantor to the turst. Under Revenue Ruling 72-471, the grantor
trust attribution rules pre-empt the trust-beneficiary attribution
rules.37
If the beneficiaries' interests are entirely discretionary, that is,
where an actuarial value of each interest cannot be determined, for
example in a sprinkling trust, section 318(a)(2)(B)(i) would seem to
preclude the attribution of the trust's shares to the beneficiaries. ' "
iii. Other Entity Attribution Rules
Under section 318(a)(2)(A), stock owned by a partnership or an
estate is treated as though it were owned proportionately by its
interested parties.3 9 Likewise, section 318(a)(3)(A) atrributes a
316. In the 1976 Senate Report, note 304 supra, the Finance Committee uses a transaction
that is virtually identical to that considered in Mitchell, as an example of the situations
intended to be covered by the amended version of § 1239.
317. 1972-2 C.B. 201, 202.
318. But see Z. CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, §
703[31[bl[ivl at 7-33 (1978).
319. Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969) (partnership
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partner's or a beneficiary's stock to the partnership or estate. Sec-
tion 318(a)(2)(C), as modified by section 1239(c), attributes shares
owned by a corporation pro rata to its shareholders, whose stock, in
turn, is considered to be owned by the corporation under section
318(a) (3)(C). Section 1239(c) applies the section 318 corporate attri-
bution rules without regard to the fifty percent rules of sections
318(a)(2)(C) and (a)(3)(C).
For example, suppose the taxpayer owns eighty percent of corpo-
rations A and B. Assume further that to avoid section 1239 the
taxpayer contributes his B stock to C-his newly formed and wholly
owned holding company-and plans to have A sell depreciable prop-
erty to B. Prior to the amendment of section 1239, the taxpayer,
through A, may have realized a capital gain on the sale. However,
the attribution rules now treat the taxpayer as owning the B stock
which is owned by C, so that A's gain on the sale will be treated as
ordinary income. Moreover, in an appropriate case, the related
party sale could activate an allocation of income under section 482
between the taxpayers or subject the sale to constructive dividend
treatment as to the controlling shareholder.32 0
In the case of a sale between commonly controlled corporations,
the treatment of gain as ordinary income occurs on the level of the
transferor corporation which sells the property, rather than on the
shareholder level. The attribution rules are used to determine
whether the eighty percent stock ownership test has been satisfied,
but, in effect, the gain is recharacterized as ordinary income at the
corporate level. When, however, the transferor is a Subchapter S
corporation, section 1373 will include the gain, which is treated as
ordinary income under section 1239, in the corporation's undistrib-
uted taxable income. This amount will also be taxed to the share-
holders.32 '
iv. Option Attribution Rules
The final section 318 attribution rule treats the holder of an op-
tion to acquire stock as the owner of the optional shares.32 2 Where
both the family and option attribution rules can apply, section
318(a)(5)(D) gives precedence to the option rule. Therefore, stock
in process of dissolution is subject to § 318); see Treas. Reg. § 1.318-2(c); Rev. Rul. 67-24,
1967-1 C.B. 75 (application of § 318 to estate and testamentary trust). Neither the Code nor
the Regulations address the question of which interest is appropriate to use when a partner's
interest in income differs from that in the partnership capital. See also Z. CAVrrcH, supra note
318, § 703[3][b][ii] at 7-27.
320. See S. REP., supra note 304, at 30; 1976-3 C.B. at 672 n.4.
321. 1976-3 C.B. at 671 n.3.
322. I.R.C. § 318(a)(4).
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which is constructively owned by one family member under the
option rule can be reattributed to another family member. The
section 318(a)(5)(C) prohibition against sidewise attribution-from
an interested party to an entity and then from the entity to another
party:-does not apply to the option rule. For example, stock owned
by an interested party and attributed to a partnership, estate, trust,
or corporation because the entity has an option to acquire those
shares can be reattributed from the option holder to another inter-
ested party.
Although the status of contingent options is unclear, the taxpayer
in Trotz v. Commissioner32 probably would have been found to have
owned all the corporate shares in question for purposes of section
1239. Despite being unable to exercise his option while the twenty-
one percent owner remained employed by the company, the tax-
payer could discharge the employee at will. The option right was
absolute, not contingent, and certainly would have triggered section
1239. The correct categorization of the corporation's right of first
refusal was thus irrelevant, since the taxpayer would have exceeded
the section 1239 threshold.
The option attribution rules should not cause the magnitude of
problems in the ordinary section 1239 transaction that they have in
other situations to which section 318(a)(4) applies.3 2 In a usual
transfer between related parties, rarely would one party own con-
vertible debentures, warrants, or other hybrid securities. Instead,
the sort of option that is likely to trigger section 318(a)(4)'s activa-
tion of section 1239 is the buy-sell agreement between shareholders,
the corporation's right of first refusal, or a similar restriction on the
transferability of shares. Certainly this is a function of the size of a
corporation in which Congress must be concerned about related
parties owning eighty percent or more of the value of the shares.
Nevertheless, the more unusual type of options now may operate to
convert capital gain into ordinary income. Since section 1239 is not
limited in application to either small or insubstantial corporations,
its amendment may be a harbinger of contests yet to be litigated.
Section 1239 is one of a few Code provisions directed toward the
character, rather than the existence, of income to be taxed on the
transfer of depreciable property. 325 But, like those sections which try
323. 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 687 (1967) discussed supra note 302.
324. See Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275, 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5131 (10th Cir. 1964)
(employee stock options on unissued stock are subject to attribution). Contra Treas. Reg. §
1.302-3(a) (unissued stock is disregarded); Rev. Rul. 68-601, 1968-2 C.B, 124, 125-26 (warrants
and convertible debentures are options within the purview of I.R.C. § 318(a)(4); Sorem will
not be followed).
325. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250; Gallagher, supra note 286.
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to hinder attempts by related taxpayers to shift losses '6 or manipu-
late deductions within the economic unit,2 section 1239 tries to
restrict the transferability of depreciation deductions between re-
lated parties. However, section 1239 is designed to accomplish more
than a limit on deductions. It is intended to prevent the tandem
advantages of depreciation-shielded ordinary income taxed at the
preferential capital gains rate. Despite the significance of its pur-
pose, section 1239 has been misconstrued on the rare occasions when
it has been used. The report of the Senate Finance Committee noted
that the former terms of section 1239 should have been sufficient to
encompass transfers similar to that in Mitchell, which was "directly
or indirectly" between related parties.328 The amended version
should give section 1239 a new vitality, and an ominous warning to
related parties whose transactions approach the statute too closely.
G. Correlation with Prior Events
The tax system attempts to equalize taxable years by matching
items received or expenses incurred with the corollary rates applica-
ble to capital or noncapital assets.32' Sometimes, however, events
of one year are so closely related to events which occur in a following
year that Congress and the courts have had to characterize the latter
events with reference to the connected events of the prior year. For
instance, section 111 is a partial codification of the tax benefit
rule,33 and section 186 may be viewed as a "non-tax benefit" rule
directed to the recovery of certain antitrust damages. 33' Similarly,
section 1341 attempts to ameliorate the claim-of-right rule where
repayments of amounts previously received occur under specified
circumstances 3 2 Other examples in the Code include sections 108
326. I.R.C. § 267(a)(1); see Hamovit, supra note 283.
327. I.R.C. § 267(a)(2).
328. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 30-31 (Supp. Comm. Rep. 1976), reprinted
in 1976-3 C.B. 643, 672-73.
329. See American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 7 A.F.T.R.2d 687 (1961);
I.R.C. §§ 441, 443; Austin, Surrey, Warren & Winokur, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
Tax Accounting, 68 HARv. L. REv. 257 (1954); Freeman, Recognition of Gain on Yearend
Stock Sales, 30 TAx L. REv. 197 (1975).
330. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 31 A.F.T.R. 773 (1943). See generally
O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit
Rule.in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAx L. REV. 215 (1972).
331. I.R.C. § 186. See, e.g., Bresler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 182 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B.
2 (amount received in settlement of an antitrust proceeding in part represented compensation
for loss incurred in prior year when a Subchapter S corporation sold its business equipment
and reported an ordinary loss. Gain recovered was ordinary income).
332. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 423 F.2d 727, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-844 (Ct. Cl.
1970), supplemented by, 427 F.2d 727, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-1403, modified, 433 F.2d 1324, 26
A.F.T.R.2d 70-5812; I.R.C. § 1341; see Hendershott, Restoration-Claim of Right-One As-
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and 1017, which permit exclusion of discharge of indebtedness in-
come if the taxpayer consents to a basis reduction,3 3 and section
1038, which is concerned with the tax consequences of repossessing
real property.3' To some extent, all the nonrecognition provisions
attempt to correlate prior events with present recognition of gain or
loss, as does section 1012, which requires basis adjustments to re-
flect past transactions.
In addition to the partial list of Code sections given above, there
is a large area of judicial discretion in which courts match past and
present events. For example, in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, the
taxpayers reported a capital gain on a corporate liquidation that
took place during 1937 to 1939.3 Five years after the dissolution, a
judgment was entered against the corporation and against one of the
taxpayers personally. After they satisfied the judgment, the taxpay-
ers took an ordinary loss deduction for the amount paid. The Service
disallowed the deduction on the ground that the judgment was capi-
tal in nature, even though the taxpayer neither sold nor exchanged
a capital asset during the year the judgment had been paid. Clearly,
if the judgment had been paid in 1940, the loss would have been
capital, as it would have arisen from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset, and would have been entered against the taxpayers as trans-
ferees of the liquidation distribution.
The Court found the payments to be capital losses because they
were inextricably related to the prior liquidation. 36 Although the
Court stated that it was not reopening or readjusting the prior year's
returns, it reasoned that it was impossible to characterize the pay-
ments without reference to the events which gave rise to the judg-
ment.37 Thus, Arrowsmith can be read to mean that an expenditure
for a business purpose will not be treated as an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense if it is sufficiently related to an earlier capital
pect of Section 1341, 48 TAXEs 585 (1970). See also United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S.
678, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 69-1186 (1969), discussed at text accompanying note 339, infra.
333. See generally Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A
Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. Rav. 225 (1959); Sanders, Debt Cancellation
Without Realization of Income, in UMvmrry oF SOUTHEN CAUFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW ELEV-
wfrH TAX hIsrrrurE 565 (J. Ervin ed. 1959).
334. See generally Handler, Tax Consequences of Mortgage Foreclosures and Transfers
of Real Property to the Mortgagee, 31 TAX L. Rav. 193 (1976); Levy, Tax Consequences to a
Mortgagee of Repossessing Real Property: A Look Back and a Look Forward, 42 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 330 (1968).
335. 344 U.S. 6, 42 A.F.T.R. 649 (1952). See also, Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner,
199 F.2d 657, 42 A.F.T.R. 749 (5th Cir. 1952); Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions
on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. REv. 85
(1972).
336. 344 U.S. at 8.
337. Id. at 8-9..
[Vol. 7:1
CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
gains transaction.338
In United States v. Skelly Oil Co., the court explained and ap-
plied the Arrowsmith rule. 9 Skelly Oil Co. repaid money which it
had collected under a state minimum price order which was later
declared invalid. Because of the oil depletion allowance, only 72.5%
of the overcharge had been taxed as income when Skelly reported
it. Upon repayment, Skelly deducted 100% of the overcharge as an
ordinary and necessary business expense. The Commissioner ob-
jected and the court agreed, citing Arrowsmith and section 1341.
Under section 1341 the deduction was limited to an "item included
in gross income in the year of receipt. 3 40 Arrowsmith was inter-
preted to bar the windfall which would result if income, which was
taxed at a special lower rate when received, was deductible on re-
payment at a different and more favorable rate.34 '
One frequently litigated question is whether payments made in
satisfaction of an alleged securities transaction liability are deducti-
ble as ordinary expenses when capital gains were realized on the
related sale. The source of the litigation is the nexus of events which
occur at different times.342 Generally the courts have allowed only
capital losses on the repayment because of the interrelationship of
the sale and the alleged liability.343
H. Depreciation Recapture
1. In General
Recapture is based on the principle that deductions from ordinary
income which are attributable to the depreciation allowance under
section 167 (relating to capital assets and depreciable property used
in the trade or business or held for the production of income) should
not be recovered later at lower capital gains rates.344 Depreciation
338. See, e.g., Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449, 451, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 74-6153 (2d
Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 32 A.F.T.R.2d 73-5167 (7th Cir. 1973).
339. 394 U.S. 678, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 69-1186 (1969).
340. Id. at 683.
341. Id. at 685. See also Wener v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 938, 50 A.F.T.R. 2100 (9th Cir.
1957); Estate of Machris v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 827 (1960); Estate of Shannonhouse v.
Commissioner, 21 T.C. 422 (1953) (ordinary loss not allowed on reimbursement pursuant to
a post-sale breach of warranty where the taxpayer had been taxed on the sale proceeds at
capital gains rates).
342. See Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 74-6153 (2d Cir. 1974);
Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 32 A.F.T.R.2d 73-5167 (7th Cir. 1973).
343. See also Freeman, supra note 329.
344. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), 122 CONG. REc. H9927
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 1976), explaining the reason for the 1976 changes in the recapture provi-
sions. See generally, Cook, Sec. 1245: Problems of Recognizing Gains Only, 46 TAXES 507
(1968); Geller, Depreciation on Real Estate and Its Recapture: Resolving Problems Raised
by the 1969 Act, in NEW YORK UNIvERsIrY TWENTY-NINTH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1033
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deductions reduce ordinary, and otherwise currently taxable, in-
come. The basis of depreciable property is reduced, by the terms of
section 1016, to reflect the allowable amount of depreciation. 35 Ab-
sent the various recapture sections, the sale or exchange of the prop-
erty would usually result in capital gain, measured by the difference
between the adjusted basis of the property and the amount realized.
Generally, this results because the property is a capital asset, or
because the gain is treated as capital gain by virtue of section 1231.
Therefore, without the recapture sections, the deductions taken
from ordinary income would be reflected in the amount of the gain
realized on the sale, and this amount would be taxed at the lower
capital gain rate. Certainly any taxpayer would be willing to trade
ordinary income for capital gain.
The ability to transform ordinary income into capital gain is ac-
centuated by the existence of an allowance for accelerated deprecia-
tion.36 Under various methods of accelerated depreciation con-
tained in the Code, 3 7 the taxpayer can recoup the cost of deprecia-
ble assets over a period substantially shorter than the period during
which it is economically exhausted. Hence the amount of ordinary
income which can be offset by depreciation deductions is increased
in the early years of the property's life, but must await recov-
ery-even in the form of capital gains-until the subsequent dispo-
sition of the asset. In the interim, between the time the deductions
are allowed and the time when they are reflected in taxable gain,
the taxpayer has the use of the amounts offset by the deductions.
Moreover, if the property was held until death, the asset would
receive a stepped-up basis, and the pre-death gain would be ignored
on a post-death sale .3
To eliminate conversion of ordinary deductions into capital gains,
(1971); Halperin, Capital Gains and Ordinary Deductions: Negative Income Tax for the
Wealthy, 12 B.C. INus. & Com. L. REv. 387 (1971); Horvitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The
Puddle and the Lake, 20 TAx L. REv. 285 (1965). See also I.R.C. § 47 (investment credit
recapture).
345. See also Kingsbury v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1068, 1088-90 (1976), acq. 1976-2 C.B.
2 (certain rights under the transfer of an operating agreement were § 1245 property, and would
have been subject to recapture if other than straight-line depreciation had been used).
346. I.R.C. § 167. Sections 1245 and 1250 apply to "excess depreciation," or to "additional
depreciation," which is the amount in excess of straightline depreciation. §§ 1245(a)(2),
1250(b)(1). Section 1245 recaptures all depreciation up to the gain realized. See generally
Gallagher, supra note 286; Halperin, supra note 344.
347. See I.R.C. § 167.
348. The Revenue Act of 1978 postpones for three years the effective date of the carryover
basis rules of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Therefore, the basis of property inherited from
someone dying after December 31, 1979, will be the decedent's basis prior to death, rather
than the present stepped-up basis. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (current
version at I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1023).
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Congress enacted the various recapture provisions of the Code.",9
The two principal recapture provisions are contained in sections
1245 and 1250, and are supplemented by a number of other sec-
tions.3 50 The basic mechanism which attacks the transformation of
ordinary deductions into capital gains is one by which the amount
of gain realized is reduced by the specified amount of previously
taken depreciation deductions. The gain is allocated between ordi-
nary income and capital gain, based on the prior depreciation, the
type of asset, the holding period, and the amount of gain, if any.
Recapture provisions are part of a comprehensive paradigm de-
signed to match depreciation with an equal portion of the gain real-
ized, and to treat that amount as ordinary income. Unless otherwise
provided in the recapture sections all other Code sections are over-
ridden by their provisions. 35' Furthermore, recapture is applicable
even if the taxpayer who sells or disposes of the asset is not the
taxpayer who benefited from the prior depreciation deductions .3. In
part, the recapture provisions override important nonrecognition
provisions and affect virtually every characterization section and
every form of taxpaying entity. 3
2. The Recapture Provisions
Net gains on the sale of real property used in a trade or business
generally are taxed as capital gains, and losses usually are treated
as ordinary losses.3 54 Gain on the sale of depreciable real property,
however, generally is "recaptured" and taxed as ordinary income to
the extent that the gain represents accelerated depreciation allowed
or allowable in excess of that amount computed under the straight-
line method of depreciation.3 5
Depreciation recapture was enacted in 1962 to prevent deductions
for accelerated depreciation from converting ordinary income into
capital gain.35 The 1962 provision, section 1245, only taxed gain
on a sale of "section 1245 property"-most tangible personal prop-
erty-as ordinary income to the extent of post-1962 depreciation
349. See I.R.C. §§ 1245-1252.
350. I.R.C. § 1246 (foreign investment company stock); § 1248 (stock in foreign corpora-
tions); § 1249 (sale of patents to foreign corporations); §§ 1251, 1252 (farming); § 904 (foreign
losses).
351. I.R.C. §§ 1245(d), 1250(i); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(a), 1.1250-1(c).
352. I.R.C. § 1245; Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-3(a)(3), (c).
353. See generally sources cited at note 344 supra.
354. I.R.C. § 1231; see discussion at section H.D. supra.
355. I.R.C. § 1250(a).
356. Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13, 76 Stat. 960 (1962), reprinted in 1962-
3 C.B. 111, 173-76.
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taken on the property. 57 The recapture rules were extended to real
property in 1964, by the enactment of section 1250.358 Under the 1964
version of section 1250, gain on the sale of real property was taxed
as ordinary income to'the extent of post-1963 accelerated deprecia-
tion taken on the property. If the property was held twelve months
or less, all depreciation was recaptured. If the property was held for
more than twelve months, only the excess depreciation over
straight-line was recaptured. The amount recaptured was reduced
gradually, after an initial twenty month holding period, at the rate
of one percent per month. After one hundred twenty months recap-
ture was phased out completely.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 modified the real property recapture
rules as to post-1969 depreciation. 359 The Act retained the rule under
which all depreciation, including straight-line, is recaptured if the
property is held for twelve months or less, but implemented other
changes. In the case of residential real property and certain low
income housing, section 1250(a) (1) (C) (ii), (iii) of the old law permit-
ted post-1969 depreciation in excess of straight-line to be recaptured
fully, to the extent of gain, at ordinary income rates if the property
was held for more than twelve months but less than one hundred
months.3 60 For each month over one hundred months that the prop-
erty was held, the amount of post-1969 depreciation recaptured de-
creased one percent. After two hundred months, recapture was elim-
inated.
In the case of non-residential real property, all post-1969 depre-
ciation in excess of straight-line depreciation is recaptured, but only
to the extent of the gain, regardless of the length of time the prop-
erty is held. 36' This rule was extended by the 1976 Tax Reform Act
to cover all post-1975 depreciation of residential real estate and
government subsidized housing in excess of straight-line deprecia-
tion. 3 2 However, full recapture of post-1975 depreciation only ap-
plies for the first one hundred months for government subsidized
housing, with a recapture phase-out over the second one hundred
months.3 63
Under the 1976 amendments, the recapture of excess depreciation
357. See H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 1129,
1164-65.
358. Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 231, 78 Stat. 19 (1964), reprinted in 1964-
1, 2 C.B. 6, 71.
359. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 202(a), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976); see H.R. REP., supra note 344.
360. Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 231, 78 Stat. 19 (1964) (now I.R.C. §
1250(a)).
361. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(B)(v), (2)(B)(v).
362. Id. § 1250(a)(1)(A).
363. Id. § 1250(a)(1)(B).
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on residential rental property may require three computations.
First, all post-1975 excess depreciation must be completely recap-
tured."' If the amount recaptured here is equal to the gain, then no
further calculations are necessary. If the post-1975 recapture is less
than the gain, excess depreciation taken after 1969 and before 1976
may be partially or completely recaptured. The amount recaptured
here will be the lesser of the remaining unrecaptured gain or some
percentage of the 1970-1975 excess depreciation. 311 The percentage
just referred to is one hundred percent for housing held for more
than twelve months but less than one hundred and one months.
This percentage decreases by one percent for each month that the
property has been held over one hundred months. After sixteen
years and eight months there is no recapture. Finally, excess depre-
ciation taken from 1964 to 1969 may be recaptured in part or in full
if the gain exceeds the prior amounts recaptured. 36 The pre-1970
recapture will be a percentage of the 1964-1969 excess depreciation,
or the unrecaptured gain, whichever is less. For real property held
for more than twelve months but less than twenty-one months, the
recapture will be one hundred percent. The percentage is reduced
one percent for each month that the property has been held over
twenty months.
The recapture provisions apply to all "dispositions" of section
1245 or section 1250 property, except as otherwise provided in those
sections.3 7 For example, recapture applies to corporate distributions
to shareholders, 6 corporate sales constituting part of a section 337
liquidation, 36 9 and to dispositions of certain partnership interests.
Although recapture generally will override the nonrecognition provi-
sions, 370 the amount recaptured cannot exceed the gain realized, or
the excess of the fair market value over the adjusted basis of the
property. 371 When the recapture sections do not override a nonrecog-
nition provision, they do cause gain to be recognized on the receipt
of "boot. ' 372 Similarly, they do not limit the amount of ordinary
364. Id. § 1250(a)(1)(A).
365. Id. § 1250(a)(2)(A).
366. Id. § 1250(a)(3)(A).
367. Id. §§ 1245(a)(1), 1250(a)(1), (2).
368. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-4(c), 1.1250-3(c). See generally Cohen, Coping with Recapture
Problems in Taxable Sales of Corporate Assets, 29 J. TAx. 130 (1968).
369. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(b)(1965), 1.1250-1(c)(2)(1971). See also B. BrrrKE & J.
EusrcE, supra note 309, at 11-72.
370. See, e.g., Clayton v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 911 (1969); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-1(a)(1).
371. I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(1)(B); 1250(a)(1)(B), (2)(A)(ii).
372. "Boot" is simply a cash payment which is part of the consideration in a business
transaction. See, e.g., Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3, 14, 35 A.F.T.R. 776 (1947); cf.
Rev. Rul. 69-487, 1969-2 C.B. 165 (no boot was received so no gain was recognized on conver-
sion of business automobile to personal use).
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income characterized by section 1239 if that is a greater amount
than the amount subject to recapture.3 17 Moreover, the amount re-
captured never enters the section 1231 hotchpot, but any gain in
excess of that amount is taken into account.37' If the taxpayer sells
property on the installment method, the regulations provide that
recapture income must have been taken into account prior to any
other portion of the recognized gain.
375
I. Sale of a Business
1. In General
The sale of a business is an important commercial transaction
which raises a number of tax and non-tax questions. Some of these
questions concern the nature of the entity sold, the manner of effect-
ing the transfer, and the resulting allocation of capital gain and
ordinary income. The last of these considerations requires a charac-
terization of the property sold, which, in turn, depends on the na-
ture of business and the form of the sale.3 7
2. Sole Proprietorship
Under the rule of Williams v. McGowan,77 the sale of a sole pro-
prietorship is not treated as the sale of a single asset; instead, it is
considered to be a sale of each individual asset, which only in the
aggregate constitutes the business.3 8 Therefore, the purchase price
must be allocated among the items constituting the business sold
in order to determine the character, and the amount, of the gain or
loss from the sale of the individual assets. Naturally, this allocation
requires consideration of all relevant Code provisions regarding the
sale of the asset.
373. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(f), 1.1250-1(c)(4).
374. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(a), 1.1250-1(c)(1).
375. Dunn Constr. Co. v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 440, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-802 (N.D.
Ala. 1971); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(d), 1.1250-1(c)(6).
376. See generally Childs, Buying and Selling the Subchapter S Corporation, in
UNIvEITrrY OF SOUTHERN CALtFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW TwENrY-SixTH TAx INsTrruTE 347 (D.
Lang chairman 1974); Joseph, Considerations in Applying the Rule of Williams Versus
McGowan, 13 TAx L. REV. 369 (1958); Vaughn, How to Acquire a Closely-Held Business, 22
(No. 1) PRAc. LAW. 11 (1976).
377. 152 F.2d 570, 34 A.F.T.R. 615 (2d Cir. 1945).
378. See Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544, 43 A.F.T.R. 621 (1953) (citing with
approval Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570). See also Murphy, Sale of a Sole Proprietor-
ship-An Irrationale in Three Parts, 9 TAX L. Rav. 309 (1954); Saltoun & Block, Tax Conse-
quences of Asset Valuations in Arm's Length Agreements Between Unrelated Parties, 27 TAx
L. Rav. 145 (1971).
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3. Partnership
When a business is operated in the form of a partnership the tax
consequences of a sale of the business depend upon what is sold.3"'
The partners can sell their interests in the partnership, or they can
cause the partnership to sell its assets.
Where a partnership sells its assets, the resulting gain or loss is
computed in the same manner as the sale of a sole proprietorship.N
If the partners sell their interest in the partnership, however, the
sale generally will be treated as the sale of a capital asset.3 1 The
difference in treatment between the sale of a partnership interest
and the sale of a sole proprietorship is due to the entity theory of
Subchapter K. 12
To prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain
where a partnership interest is sold, the Code provides that the
amount of gain or loss which is attributable to certain designated
ordinary income assets owned by the partnership must be treated
as ordinary income or loss to the selling partner. These items are
substantially appreciated inventory, unrealized receivables, and
recapture property.m But since some inventory with a value exceed-
ing basis is not "substantially appreciated, " 84 some gain attribut-
able to inventory may be capital gain on the sale of a partnership
interest where it would be ordinary income if the partnership sold
the items.
"Unrealized receivables" are defined by section 751(c) to include
contractual and other rights to payment for goods or services to be
"delivered or rendered in the future. They include, additionally, the
well-known accounts receivable which are not reported by the cash
basis taxpayer until paid. Gain attributable to unrealized receiv-
ables is taxed as ordinary income when a partnership interest is
sold. 385
4. Corporation
There are several ways in which a corporate business may be sold.
The shareholders can liquidate the corporation, 386 and pay a capital
gains tax on the excess of the value of the assets over their basis in
379. See generally A. WIus, PARTNERSHIP TXATION (2d ed. 1976); Morris, Disposition of
Partnership Interests: Achieving Capital-Gains Treatment, 25 TAX LAw. 473 (1972).
380. See generally Morris, supra note 379.
381. I.R.C. § 741.
382. See generally A. WaLs, supra note 379, at § 2.01-.04.
383. I.R.C. § 751.
384. See id. § 751(d).
385. Id. § 751(c).
386. Id. § 331.
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the stock. Since the shareholders' basis for the assets then will be
fair market value, they can effectuate a sale without further tax,
and the buyer will obtain a basis equal to cost. 87
Alternatively, the shareholders can sell stock. A stock sale will
result in a capital gains tax, and may qualify for installment sale
treatment under section 453. When the purchaser liquidates the
corporation, his basis for the property will be his cost for the stock,3 88
with no realization of gain on the liquidation.
The possible variations of these two means of selling a corporate
business are numerous. For example, the corporation can adopt a
plan of liquidation under section 337, sell its assets, and liquidate
within twelve months of adopting the plan. Gain is realized by the
shareholders only on the subsequent liquidation."8 9 Other possibili-
ties, explained more completely elsewhere, include a section 333 one
month liquidation, 90 a reorganization, 39' and a part sale and part
redemption of stock. 92 The shareholders must be careful to observe
the necessary requirements to qualify the transaction, however, or
unexpected results are likely to occur-not the least important of
which is the finding of a dividend.133
In any sale of a corporate business, the assets may be subject to
recapture. In considering how the sale is to be structured, the parties
undoubtedly must consider who will bear the tax.
5. Allocation
Ultimately, the buyer and seller should allocate the purchase
price among the assets sold, not only for determining the character
and amount of gain or loss, but also to establish the purchaser's
basis in particular assets.3 9 However, they have opposing interests
in the allocation. The seller wants a greater amount attributed to
capital assets, goodwill, and section 1231 assets to the extent that
gain on his sale will not constitute recapture income. Conversely,
the buyer wants the bulk of the purchase price allocated to deprecia-
ble property, inventory, and any covenant not to compete.393 Due to
387. See generally B. BrrrKR & J. EUSTIE, supra note 309, at 11.01-.06.
388. Cf. I.R.C. § 334(b) (basis equal to that of the transferor, except when certain time
limitations are met the basis shall be equal to the adjusted basis of the stock).
389. See B. BrrrKa & J. EUSTCE, supra note 309 at 11.64.
390. Id. at 11.20-.24.
392. Id. at T 14.01-.57.
392. Id. at 9.01-.65.
393. See B. Brrrx. & J. EUSTmcE, supra note 309.
394. See section 11.1.2. supra.
395. See generally Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A Reassessment of the Tax
Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 28 TAx LAw. 251 (1975); Morris, supra note 379; Murphy,
[Vol. 7:1
CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
this adversariness of interests, the Service generally will accept a
reasonable allocation that is explicitly stated in the agreement, but
will challenge one which lacks economic substance."' In all but the
most unusual case,39 the courts will reject a party's attempt to set
aside an express allocation.9 8 If the purchase agreement does not
allocate the sales price among the assets, the parties must allocate
the sales price to reflect the respective items on their tax returns.
Here, inconsistent reporting most likely will result in an audit of
both returns.
The problem that is most likely to surface in the sale of a business
is what portion of the purchase price, if any, is allocable to goodwill
as opposed to a covenant not to compete. 39' The cost of a business
can be increased by either. However, as noted elsewhere,N goodwill
is a nondepreciable capital asset, while a covenant not to compete
is similar to compensation. Therefore, goodwill generates no current
deductions for the buyer, and its sale results in capital gain to the
seller; on the other hand, payments made for a covenant not to
compete are deductible to the purchaser and taxable as ordinary
income to the seller. But because both goodwill and the covenant
are intended to transfer the going-concern value of the business, the
absence of an express allocation, once again, may cause inconsistent
reporting and a resulting audit. 10
J. Receipt or Disposition of Income-Related Items
1. In General
Transactions involving the receipt or disposition of income-
related items, such as contracts, leases, and life estates, have caused
much litigation over whether the taxpayer's gain is capital gain or
ordinary income. Certainly the issues that arise most frequently are
exemplified by the diverse interests involved, the manner in which
supra note 378; Saltoun & Block, supra note 378; Comment, Depreciability of Going Concern
Value, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 484 (1973).
396. See Blackstone Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 398 F.2d 991, 22 A.F.T.R.2d 5156 (5th
Cir. 1968); Particelli v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 498, 45 A.F.T.R. 1454 (9th Cir. 1954).
397. See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 306 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Throndson v.
Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1022, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-864 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Saltoun & Block,
supra note 378.
398. See Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 1356 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967) (particular Third Circuit standard, requiring more than "strong
proof").
399. See, e.g., Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355, 47 A.F.T.R.
858 (7th Cir. 1955); cf. Rev. Rul. 70-45, 1970-1 C.B. 17 (sale of goodwill on the admission of a
partner to a professional practice).
400. See section I.C. 1. supra as to the nondepreciability of goodwill.
401. See generally Saltoun & Block, supra note 378.
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the interests arise, and the way in which the rights to these items
are transferred. 02
Contract rights are property rights under state law, but may or
may not be "property" within the meaning of section 1221. More-
over, a contract usually will involve elements of personal service, as
well as other ingredients which may not be a substantial property
interest akin to a capital investment. In short, the rights and inter-
ests involved are hybrid, a complex bundle of interests some or all
of which may qualify as capital assets. °0 However, owing to the
complexity and divisibility of these interests, it is easier for the
taxpayer to transfer less than the entire interest, or to transfer the
full interest when that interest is more than the capital investment.
For example, the taxpayer's personal services may have enhanced
the value of corporate shares, or created a significant goodwill incre-
ment, which is realized in the form of a gain in excess of the invest-
ment when the business is sold. Also, market fluctuations or
changed circumstances may increase or decrease the value of a con-
tract or lease, resulting in one party paying a premium for its termi-
nation. Alternatively, a third party may want to acquire the rights,
at a premium, because of their favorable nature. The question faced
by the courts in these situations is whether the interest, or some part
of it, is property within the meaning of section 1221.
2. Life Estates and Similar Terminable Interests
Generally, the owner of a life estate or other similar terminable
interest has the right to use the property for the duration of the
term. This right of use usually includes the right to income from,
as well as the emblements and estovers of, the property. 04 The
holder of such an interest may alienate it, but ordinarily may not
transfer the larger property itself. Since the tenant only has the
right to use the property and to receive the proceeds generated by
it, the Service has contended that the sale of a life estate or other
similar terminable interest in property results in the receipt of ordi-
402. See generally Del Cotto, "Property" in the Capital Asset Definition: Influence of
"Fruit and Tree," 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 (1965); Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and
Assignment of Income-the Ferrer Case, 20TAx L. REv. 1 (1964); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment
of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 295 (1962);
Parnell, Sale of Contracts: When Capital Gains Treatment is Available to the Seller, 43 J.
TAX. 200 (1975); Note, Capital Gains Treatment of an Interest in Future Profits, 21 Sw. L.J.
815 (1967).
403. See, e.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 1 A.F.T.R.2d 1394 (1958);
United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5895 (5th Cir. 1963); Note,
Professional Organization and Unrealized Receivables, 14 Aiz. L. REv. 853 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Professional Organization).
404. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PIOPzRTY 58-62 (1962).
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nary income rather than capital gain or loss.40 5 However, in Bell's
Estate v. Commissioner'" and in McAllister v. Commissioner, °0 the
Eighth and Second Circuits, respectively, held that a life interest
is a capital asset and therefore that any gain or loss upon sale is
capital. In both cases the courts distinguished Hort v.
Commissioner0 8 from Blair v. Commissioner.' In Blair the Su-
preme Court ruled that an assignment of a life estate was a transfer
of an interest in the underlying asset itself, and not merely an as-
signment of income." 0 Relying on this rationale, both McAllister
and Bell's Estate held that the transfer of the interests was not a
transfer of the "naked rights to receive income,"''4 but rather of
property which was a capital asset. The court in McAllister ex-
plained that:
[T]he line of demarcation between the Blair and the Hort princi-
ples is obviously one of some difficulty to define explicitly or to
establish in borderline cases. Doubtless all would agree that there
is some distinction between selling a life estate in property and
anticipating income for a few years in advance. . . .The distinc-
tion seems logically and practically to turn upon anticipation of
income payments over a reasonably short period of time and an
out-and-out transfer of a substantial and durable property inter-
est, such as a life estate at least is."'
Under this reasoning the interest was found to be a capital asset.
Although both McAllister and Bell's Estate held, on the authority
of Blair, that the life interest was a capital asset which would gener-
ate capital gain on its sale, neither court addressed an essential
difference between their respective situations and Blair. In Blair the
issue was not the character of the property transferred; it was the
405. See generally Andrews, Disposition of a Life Estate in Realty: What are the Implica-
tions of Rev. Rul. 72-601?, 40 J. TAX. 26 (1974); Dean, Capital Gain and Ordinary In-
come-Problems in Transmutation, in NEw YORK UNVEIsrrY Twsairy-FouRTH INSTrruFE ON
FEDERAL TAXATON 1291 (H. Sellin ed. 1966); Joyce & Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA
Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests,
31 TAX L. REv. 121 (1976); Note, Federal Income Tax Law in Future Interest Transactions,
46 Dm. L.J. 286 (1969); Note, Capital Gains Treatment of an Interest in Future Profits, 21
Sw. L.J. 815 (1967).
406. 137 F.2d 454, 31 A.F.T.R. 411 (8th Cir. 1943).
407. 157 F.2d 235, 35 A.F.T.R. 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1946), acq. Rev.
Rul. 72-243, 1972-1 C.B. 233.
408. 313 U.S. 28, 25 A.F.T.R. 1207 (1941).
409. 300 U.S. 5, 18 A.F.T.R. 1132 (1937).
410. See Del Cotto, supra note 402, at 7-10, 27-33; Lyon & Eustice, supra note 402, for a
discussion of Blair and the assignment of income doctrine.
411. 137 F.2d at 458.
412. 157 F.2d at 237.
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question of to whom the trust income should be taxed. For purposes
of selecting the appropriate taxpayer, the life estate in Blair was
"property." When this "property" was transferred, the obligation to
pay tax on the income therefrom also shifted.113 Blair was not con-
cerned with whether the interest was a capital asset since the trans-
fer was gratuitous. Conversely, the issue in McAllister and Bell's
Estate was not the selection of the proper taxpayer, but whether the
transfer was one of a capital asset. The questions focus on different
facets of the transaction, although they both implicitly involve the
conclusion that there has been an effective transfer of some inter-
est. 4
14
The purchaser of a life estate can amortize the cost basis obtained
over the expected duration of the interest, but the recipient of a gift
or bequest of a life or term interest is precluded, by section 273, from
amortizing any basis against receipts.45 Moreover, under section
1001(e) the basis of a life or term interest acquired by gift or bequest
is disregarded in the case of a sale of the interest.411 Therefore, gain
is taxable in full, but it remains capital gain. The grantee or devisee
of the life or term interest continues to have a basis in the interest
under section 1014, but the basis is taken into account only when
the tenant joins with the remainderman in selling the entire prop-
erty in a single transaction. 417
The distinction drawn in McAllister between the "anticipation of
income payments" and the "out-and-out transfer of a substantial
and durable property interest" raises the question of whether re-
ceipts from the sale of a term interest will remain capital gain where
the purchase price is paid in installments or on a contingent basis,
such as by a private annuity.t5 In Evans v. Commissioner"' the
Service argued that there was no sale where the tenant transferred
her life interest for an annuity. The Tax Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the taxpayer merely was receiving the income
from the transferred interest and held that the sale generated capi-
tal gains. The payments were fixed, and were not dependent on the
income of the transferred property. 40 However, in Hrobon v.
413. See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 5 A.F.T.R. 5380 (1925); I.R.C. § 102(b).
414. See Del Cotto, supra note 402, at 27-33.
415. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-5 (1978); Andrews, supra note 405.
416. See Andrews, supra note 405; Capital Gains Treatment of an Interest in Future
Profits, supra note 402.
417. See Andrews, supra note 405; Captial Gains Treatment of an Interest in Future
Profits, supra note 402.
418. But cf. Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1191 (9th Cir. 1975)
(court recharacterized an attempted private annuity transaction with a foreign trust as a
transfer with a reserved life estate and gift of the remainder).
419. 30 T.C. 798 (1958).
420. Id.
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Commissioner42' the same court, distinguishing Evans, held that
where the taxpayer assigned to her husband a life estate in a trust
in return for an annuity with annual payments equal to sixty per-
cent of the trust income, the transaction merely was a gift of forty
percent of the life estate, and that no sale occurred.2 2
It should be evident that if a life estate is a capital asset, a re-
mainder interest is a capital asset as well. Where the remainderman
purchases the preceding life interest, he does not have to wait for a
sale of the property to recover his investment. 23 Rather, he may
amortize his cost, under section 167., over the life expectancies of the
sellers. Indeed, because the amortization deduction is authorized by
section 167, the court in Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v.
Commissioner'2' allowed a full deduction although over ten percent
of the trust income consisted of tax-exempt interest. The court re-
jected the Service's contention that section 265 precluded the de-
duction, noting that section 265 denies section 212 expenses but not
those under section 167. 4' 5
Although a remainder is a capital asset, gain on the sale of a
purchased remainder may be ordinary income in part if the pur-
chaser bought the interest at a discount. 26 If gain on the sale of a
remainder is due to appreciation, however, it should be capital in
nature.
Because remainders, life estates, and other term interests repre-
sent less than the entire amount or duration of a larger property
interest, the decisions in which the question is raised as to whether
they are capital assets tend to be cloudy and inconsistent. It often
appears that the courts are confusing the assignment of income
doctrine with the capital asset question.'" The murky reasoning
seems to exist because a partial interest in a larger piece of property
may closely resemble "fruit," while the underlying asset itself re-
sembles the "tree.4 2 8 However, assignment of income principles are
concerned with who is the taxpayer; capital asset rules are con-
cerned with the characterization of property and gain or loss result-
ing from its sale or exchange. The questions are different, and it is
421. 41 T.C. 476 (1964).
422. Id. See also Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1191 (9th Cir.
1975).
423. Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253,45 A.F.T.R. 1403 (7th Cir. 1954). See generally Danzis,
The Favorable Tax Treatment of Remainder Interest Investments, 24 TAX L. REv. 527 (1969).
424. 431 F.2d 664, 26 A.F.T.R.2d 70-5502 (2d Cir. 1970).
425. I.R.C. }" 265(l).
426. Jones v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 302, 13 A.F.T.R.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1964); see Danzis,
supra note 423.
427. See generally Del Cotto, supra note 402.
428. For a discussion of the "Fruit and Tree" doctrine, see Del Cotto, supra note 402.
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not beneficial to deny the existence of the sale of a capital asset
when that is what has occurred.
Once having recognized that, in fact, a partial interest in a larger
whole may be sold as a capital asset, the courts would be wise to
acknowledge that gain-or income-can be attributed to the trans-
feror, even when it is received by the transferee. The transaction
simply may run afoul of the assignment of income rules, despite an
effective sale of a capital asset.' Moreover, the fact that the pur-
chase price is satisfied by deferred payments, rather than in a lump
sum, should not be dispositive of the case without further inquiry.
3. Anticipatory Disposition of Future Income
The anticipatory disposition of future income is a concept that is
inextricably intertwined with the assignment of income doctrine,
yet one which permeates the capital asset area.4ss For example, if
property is sold which includes a right to ordinary income, or if the
right to the income itself is sold, the gain or receipts most likely will
be characterized as ordinary income."' The sale simply is not one
of a capital asset. Therefore, accounts receivable sold with a busi-
ness will give rise only to ordinary income. 32 Similarly, the purchase
price of an obligation sold between interest dates will reflect the
accrued but unpaid interest, which in turn will be taxed as ordinary
income. The seller cannot convert interest into capital gain, even
though the value of the underlying investment property lies in its
ability to produce recurring receipts.ss Moreover, it has long been
established that the right to the income component itself cannot be
alienated as an independent property right which, when sold, re-
sults in capital gain. Hence, in Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner4 3
the court held that a sale of an accrued dividend resulted in ordinary
income to the stockholder.
However, for reasons of uniformity and administrative conven-
429. But see Salvatore v. Commissioner, 434 F.2d 600, 26 A.F.T.R.2d 70-5857 (2d Cir.
1970).
430. See generally Del Cotto, supra note 402; Lyon & Eustice, supra note 402.
431. See, e.g., Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-710
(6th Cir. 1973).
432. I.R.C. § 1221(4). See also Drybrough v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 424 (1966), aff'd, 384
F.2d 715, 20 A.F.T.R.2d 5678 (6th Cir. 1967).
433. Compare Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31, 25 A.F.T.R. 1207 (1941), where Mr.
Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, argued that the amounts received were essentially
substitutes for "rental payments which [§ 61(a)(5)] expressly characterizes as gross income
.with United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56, 59, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5895 (5th
Cir. 1963), where Judge Cameron distinguished the right "to earn" income from the right to
"earned" income.
434. 131 F.2d 50, 30 A.F.T.R. 220 (6th Cir. 1942).
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ience, the entire gain or loss on the sale of shares is taxed as capital
gain or loss. This is so even where the stock is sold after the declara-
tion of a dividend, but before the record date, when the price of the
share presumably reflects the right to the dividend. 3 5
4. Substitutes For Ordinary Income
There are many ways in which a right to, or a claim for, ordinary
income can be structured so that it appears to be "property" from
which capital gain can be realized . 3e By expressly providing that
accounts receivable for section 1221(1) items, or on account of per-
sonal services, are not within the definition of capital assets,4 3 the
Code implicitly acknowledges that ordinary income items can be
dressed up to appear to be capital assets. Similarly, the bulk sale
of inventory will not convert the proceeds into capital receipts. It is
possible, however, that subdivided realty may be sold as a single
tract with the proceeds being capital gains13S-a reverse variation on
the investment "liquidation" cases.1'
The more the otherwise ordinary income items take on the ap-
pearance of a recognized property right under state law, the more
difficult it is for the courts to distinguish those items which fall
within the congressional design for capital assets from those which
retain the attributes of ordinary income."0 In some instances the
ultimate distinction may rest primarily on who holds and who sells
the item. A purchaser of an account receivable may achieve the
status of an investor and be accorded capital gains on the sale or
exchange of the receivable,"' where the initial holder of the account
or note may have received only ordinary income on its satisfac-
435. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-9(c)(1978).
436. See section II.l supra; Part Two, supra note 2, section III.C. See generally Parnell,
supra note 402; see also United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5895
(5th Cir. 1963); Kingsbury v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1068 (1976), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 2 (pay-
ments were not substitutes for the taxpayer's ordinary income even though they were based
on a percentage of the "lessee's" gross receipts from the assignment of a cardroom license);
Guggenheim v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 559, 569 (1966).
437. I.R.C. § 1221(4).
438. I.R.C. § 1237.
439. See section I.B.3.c. supra.
440. See Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897, 10 A.F.T.R.2d 5569
(5th Cir. 1962). See also Note, Tax Consequences of Rescission: The Interplay Between
Private and Public Law, 42 U. CI. L. Rav. 562 (1975).
441. See Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 348, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1967)
where the court found that Pounds was in fact an investor, but denied him capital gains
treatment because it could find no sale or exchange. Judge Wisdom, for the court, stated:
"If Pounds' interest were considered a capital asset and if it had been sold to a third party
shortly before Gilson disposed of the real estate, the income realized from the sale should be
taxable at capital gains rates." Id. at 351.
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tion.112 The latter taxpayer could not assert a claim to investor sta-
tus since the note or account probably would have arisen in the
ordinary course of the trade or business. The real distinction be-
tween the two taxpayers is not, in the language of Hudson v.
Commissioner,"3 that the original holder's claim "vanished" upon
payment while the purchaser "sold or exchanged" the purchased
claim, but rather that the original holder simply did not have a
property interest that was within the design of the capital asset
provisions. The purchaser, who probably acquired the claim at a
discount, had the characteristics of an investor which came within
the legislative design.4 4 To premise the distinction on the absence
of a sale or exchange, or to say that the claim "vanished," is artifi-
cial, and obfuscates the issue. The original holder's receipts in satis-
faction of the obligation is as much a "sale or exchange" as if the
proceeds were received in the transaction from which the indebted-
ness arose (provided, of course, that it did not originate in a loan or
in an obligation to pay for services). Naturally, if the purchaser was
a dealer in such accounts, the amounts received would be ordinary
income from the trade or business of dealing in those accounts.
Compensation for services is ordinary income. When it is received
contemporaneously with the rendition of the services there generally
is no question that the fee, salary, or wage is not an amount paid
for the sale or exchange of "property," i.e., the services. Neverthe-
less, the performance of personal services may culminate in the
creation of property or give rise to a claim for payment. For exam-
ple, the taxpayer's activities may result in: a claim for a fee for
professional services; an increased value in the shares of a closely-
held corporation; or the creation of an artistic work or one which is
subject to the copyright or patent laws. Moreover, compensation
may be received partially in the form of property, the right to ac-
quire property (whether at fair market value, at a discount, or sub-
ject to restrictions), or in other forms of deferred or executive com-
pensation.4 45 Clearly the argument for capital gains becomes more
442. See Hudson v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 734 (1953), aff'd sub non. Ogilvie v. Commis-
sioner, 216 F.2d 748, 46 A.F.T.R. 1089 (6th Cir. 1954).
In a hypothetical case, if the judgment had been transferred to someone other than
the judgment debtor, the property transferred would still be in existence after the
transaction was completed. However, as it actually happened, when the judgment
debtor settled the judgment, the claim arising from the judgment was extinguished
without the transfer of any property or property right to the judgment debtor.
20 T.C. at 736.
443. 20 T.C. 734, 737 (1953), aff'd sub noma. Ogilvie v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 748, 46
A.F.T.R. 1089 (6th Cir. 1954).
444. See Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1967).
445. See generally Anderson, Traditional Forms of Compensation (Options, Stock, and
Cash) After the Tax Reform Act, in UNtvEasrry OF SoUrHERN CALFOaNI SCHOOL OF LAw
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persuasive, and more difficult to deal with, when the value of per-
sonal services becomes intertwined with these and other salable
property interests and rights." 6 The task of distinguishing ordinary
from capital gain is not made noticeably easier by the many Code
sections, including section 1221, which address the problem. " 7
The installment method of reporting under section 453 applies
only to gain on the sale or other disposition of property; it does not
apply to compensation for services. Obviously, making this distinc-
tion can be difficult, but the Service has considered the problem.
In Revenue Ruling 73-438, the Service ruled that a builder of custom
homes for lot owners could not elect the installment method of
reporting because he was being paid for services, not for the sale of
property.448
Section 1221(4) attempts to prevent the conversion of a claim for
payment for personal services already rendered into a capital
asset.441 Nevertheless, the possibility remains that such a claim,
when sold, could become a capital asset.4 50 But payments received
by an employee for the release of his employer from the terms of an
employment contract usually will be ordinary income-even where
the release is structured as a sale.4 5' For the purposes of the capital
asset provisions, the term "property" does not include the expecta-
tion of receiving compensation for services to be performed in the
future. Nor does it include the right to receive renewal commissions
TwENTY-FoURTH TAX INsTrrTE 547 (R. Forster ed. 1972); Metzer, Constructive Receipt, Eco-
nomic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case Study in Deferred Compensation, 29 TAX
L. REv. 525 (1974); Stanger, The Interplay of Section 83 and Section 305, 54 TAxEs 235 (1976).
446. See Chirelstein, Capital Gain and the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The Income
Tax Treatment of Contract Termination Payments, 49 MINN. L. Rv. 1 (1964); Eustice, supra
note 402; Professional Organization, supra note 403.
447. I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1231-37, 1239, 1242-46, 1249-53. See also Professional Organization,
supra note 403.
448. Rev. Rul. 73-438, 1973-2 C.B. 157 (which superseded Rev. Rul. 59-250, 1959-2 C.B.
134, because the latter erroneously implied that custom home builders commonly keep inven-
tories of materials); cf. Rev. Rul. 73-437, 1973-2 C.B. 156 (seller of "shell homes" can qualify
as a dealer in personal property by § 453(a)). See Town and Country Food Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C. 1049 (1969); cf. Realty Loan Corp. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1083 (1970), aff'd
478 F.2d 1049, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-1183 (9th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer sold a mortgage servicing
company, from which his right to future income was held not to be compensation for services:
§ 453 treatment allowed).
449. See Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-1240 (8th Cir. 1974);
Freese v. United States, 455 F.2d 1146, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-600 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 879 (1972); O'Neill v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 7 (1964).
450. See Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1967), noted
in 21 Sw. L.J. 815 (1967); cf. Strauss v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 441, 36 A.F.T.R. 1072 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (1948) (compensation in the form of a percentage of royalties,
an interest to such having been assigned to the spouse, was nonetheless taxable to the person
who rendered the services).
451. McFall v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936).
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in the future."' But Congress has provided some statutory excep-
tions for certain types of compensation, including specified stock
options453 and some distributions from qualified pension plans.45
Where "property," other than that directly related to the com-
pensation for past, present, or future services, is created by personal
services, the resultant interest stands a better chance of being cate-
gorized as a capital asset. For example, goodwill created by the
personal efforts of the taxpayer may increase the value of the busi-
ness or the price of corporate shares. That portion of the purchase
allocable to these efforts, through the enhanced value, generally will
be classified as capital gain."'
5. Sale of Contract Rights
The issues raised incident to the release, surrender, termination,
or sale of contract rights are closely related to the problems dis-
cussed previously concerning the receipt or disposition of income-
related items.456 The tension here, however, arises because contract
rights generally are recognized property rights under state law, (in-
dicating capital gain or loss), even though these rights may relate
explicitly to the performance of services or the supplying of goods
which, under the income tax, will result in ordinary income. The
disposition of enforceable contract rights, especially when it is in
return for a payment from the other party to the contract, forces the
courts to consider whether any gain should be characterized as ordi-
nary income on the premise that the consideration received is a
substitute for future ordinary income which would have been earned
had the contract continued. For example, in United States v.
Woolsey, the court stated that: "[cilose scrutiny is required if the
consideration received [for the disposition of the contract rights]
is actually a present substitute for what would have been ordinary
earned income in the hands of the assigning taxpayer, if the assign-
ment or transfer had not been made. '457
452. Foxe v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 21 (1969).
453. I.R.C. § 422.
454. I.R.C. § 402. See also I.R.C. § 1240 which, until rendered obsolete by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, permitted certain amounts received by an employee on the termination of a long
term employment agreement to be reported as capital gains, under limited circumstances.
455. Johnson v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 414 (1969); accord, Kelly v. Commissioner, 39
T.C.M. (P-H) 1191 (1970). But see I.R.C. § 341 (collapsible corporations); I.R.C. § 1221(3)
(copyrights, compositions, memoranda, etc.). See also Professional Organization, supra note
403.
456. See section II.J. 1. -4. supra. See generally Eustice, supra note 402; Parnell, supra note
402.
457. 326 F.2d 287, 291, 13 A.F.T.R.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Alternatively, the gain may be characterized as capital in nature,
on the basis that the rights disposed of constituted a capital asset.
That is, the contract rights terminated were "property," within the
meaning of the capital asset provisions, and had value because they
would produce future income. In United States v. Dresser Indus-
tries, Inc., the court explained that:
[als a legal or economic position . . . . [tihe only commercial
value of any property is the present worth of future earnings or
usefulness. If the expectation of earnings of stock rises, the market
value of the stock may rise; at least a part of this increase in price
is attributable to the expectation of increased income.
The fact that the income which could be earned would be ordi-
nary income is immaterial; such would be true of the sale of all
income-producing property.458
Drawing this line clearly is the crux of the problem. 5
Transactions in, and those relating to, the entertainment industry
have caused a particularly noticeable amount of litigation, involv-
ing, inter alia, collapsible corporations,10 personal holding compa-
nies,4"' and film production companies."' In Benny v.
Commissioner"4 3 the taxpayer and some associates formed a corpora-
tion which contracted with a sponsor to produce a radio program.
458. 324 F.2d 56, 59, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5895 (5th Cir. 1963); see Del Cotto, supra note 402.
See also Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344, 1 A.F.T.R.2d 874 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 919 (1958).
459. See Del Cotto, supra note 402; Eustice, supra note 402.
460. I.R.C. § 341; Rosenbaum, Entertainer's Corporations and Capital Gains, 12 TAx L.
REv. 33 (1956). See B. Birrimi & J. EusncE, supra note 309.
461. I.R.C. § 543; see B. BiTrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 309. See also Emory, The
Personal Holding Company Tax and Intercompany Transactions with Members of an Affili-
ated Group-New Difficulty with an Old Misconception, 30 TAx L. REv. 283 (1975). o
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 modified the personal holding company provisions in two
principal respects. First, § 543(a)(5)(B) was changed to ensure that "produced film rents"
did not require the finding of a depreciable interest in the property, as was the Service's
position following Carnegie Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 642 (1973). S. REP. No. 94-
938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-81, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3515, 3516.
Second, it amended § 543(a) to differentiate between "rents" and "royalties" in the leasing
of intangibles. This was intended to modify the Service's position in Rev. Rul. 71-596, 1971-2
C.B. 242. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3838, 3838. H.R. REP. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 334-37 (1975).
462. See Appel, The Motion Picture Service Company: A Service to the Motion Picture
Industry?, in UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW TWENTY-SEVENTH TAx
INsTrrrUrE 559 (D. Lang chairman 1975); Blanc, Current Income Tax Developments of Interest
to the Entertainment Industry, in UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW
TwENTY-SIxTm TAx INsTrrTE 1083 (D. Lang chairman 1974); cf. Ardi, Tax Planning for
Foreign Entertainers Who Perform Within the United States, 32 TAx LAW 349 (1979).
463. 25 T.C. 197 (1955), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 4.
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Thereafter the stock was bought by CBS, and the gain was taxed
as capital gain. The Service subsequently acquiesced, and an-
nounced that Benny would be followed where the facts showed that
the consideration received "represented payment for the property
transferred and no part represented payment for future services.""'
Despite the Service's announcement that Benny would be fol-
lowed only where no part of the consideration received represented
payment for future services, the courts have indicated a tendency
to permit an allocation of the payments between ordinary service
income and capital gains. For example, in Commissioner v.
Ferrer,"' the Second Circuit held that there should be an apportion-
ment between those amounts attributable to Ferrer's "equitable
property interest" in the play and those allocable to his right to
receive a percentage of the film proceeds. The Ferrer rationale was
followed by the Fifth Circuit in Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v.
Tomlinson.'" There, the taxpayer sold its contractual rights to act
as a mortgage-servicing agent. The court held that the transaction
was partly a sale of future commissions, taxable as ordinary income,
and partly a sale of goodwill, files, and equipment, taxable as capi-
tal gain." 7 Conversely, in Commissioner v. Pittston Co.,'16 a coal
distributor was found to have realized ordinary income on the pay-
ment received for the surrender of its contract rights to purchase all
of the coal extracted by another company for a specified period. The
court reasoned that the taxpayer surrendered a "naked contract
right" and received a substitute for ordinary income in the form of
the consideration. However, its decision turned on its inability to
find a sale or exchange, not on a finding that the contract was not
a capital asset-a conclusion which would have been difficult to
defend in the presence of a rising market.'69
A recurring theme in the sale-of-contract-rights cases is the
substitute-for-ordinary-income concept. For example, a lump-sum
payment for the cancellation of an insurance agency contract was
464. Rev. Rul. 59-325, 1959-2 C.B. 185; see Rosenbaum, supra note 460. See also Del
Cotto, supra note 402, on assignment of income.
465. 304 F.2d 125, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 1651 (2d Cir. 1962); see section I.D.I. supra. See also
Eustice, supra note 402.
466. 320 F.2d 929, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5025 (5th Cir. 1963).
46. But see Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897, 10 A.F.T.R.2d 5569
(5th Cir. 1962).
468. 252 F.2d 344; accord, General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360, 44
A.F.T.R. 72 (2d Cir.), cert.-denied, 346 U.S. 866 (1953); Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc.,
204 F.2d 673, 43 A.F.T.R. 972 (2d Cir. 1953); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. United States,
427 F.2d 749, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-1374 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
469. Compare World Publishing Corp. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 819
(8th Cir. 1962) with Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592, 6 A.F.T.R.2d 5493
(9th Cir. 1960). See also Del Cotto, supra note 402; note 479 and accompanying text infra.
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characterized as ordinary income in Elliott v. United States.'" The
court held that the consideration was a substitute for the ordinary
income that would have been earned if the contract had not been
cancelled."' Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held in Wiseman v. Halli-
burton Oil Well Cementing Co.'72 that the taxpayer realized ordi-
nary income on the sale of an exclusive license to use and to subli-
cense a patented process. But in United States v. Dresser Industries,
Inc., the court held that the sale of an exclusive license to use a
patented process resulted in capital gain. 413 Although Dresser ap-
pears to be the better decision, it attempted to distinguish Wiseman
on the basis that the sales price in that case was attributable solely
to the oil company's right to sublicense the process-a substitute for
ordinary royalty income.74 Clearly, some portion of the purchase
price in Wiseman was attributable to the taxpayer's exclusive li-
cense, and gain on the sale may have been due partially to market
forces. These factors should have been given greater consideration
by the respective courts.4' 5
The effect of market fluctuations on contract values can result in
capital gain if the contract is sold at a gain, even if the contract is
one for the delivery of goods and the performance of services. In
Estate of Shea v. Commissioner,'46 the taxpayer realized a substan-
tial gain on the sale of a ship's charter granting the right to perform
designated ocean hauls for a specified term and rate. The gain was
due to the excess of the rate in the taxpayer's charter over the
prevailing market rate for new charters.' 7 The Tax Court held that
the gain was capital gain, rejecting the Service's argument that the
charter was only the right to earn future income, rather than prop-
erty within the design of the capital gain provisions.
The attempt to distinguish the sale of the right to future earnings
from the sale of the right to past earnings to be received in the future
has resulted in a legion of apparently inconsistent decisions. While
the uncertainty is greatest when the rights surrendered involved
elements of personal service, it is also evident when the value of
470. 431 F.2d 1149, 26 A.F.T.R. 2d 70-5473 (10th Cir. 1970); see Vaaler v. United States,
454 F.2d 1120, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-481 (8th Cir. 1972).
471. Accord, United States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d 111, 10 A.F.T.R.2d 6034 (5th Cir. 1962),
modified, 312 F.2d 744, 11 A.F.T.R.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1963) (sale of rights to act as general life
insurance agent held to result in ordinary income).
472. 301 F.2d 654, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1962).
473. 324 F.2d 56, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5895 (5th Cir. 1963).
474. Id. at 59.
475. See generally Part Two, supra note 2, section Ill.H.6. for the considerations used to
determine whether all "substantial rights" to a patent have been sold.
476. 57 T.C. 15 (1971).
477. See id. at 24-25.
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such rights has been enhanced by some other factor, such as scar-
city, and even where the rights concerned traditionally have been
considered proprietary.
The distinction between the sale of the right to future earnings
and the sale of the right to past earnings to be received in the future
requires concise analysis. The value of the right to earn income in
the future may be fairly predictable, but it is always uncertain. It
is a property right which will have a basis equal to the purchaser's
cost, and the seller's proceeds should be capital gain. Conversely,
the right to receive income in the future that is earned presently is
merely an attempted assignment of income, and is rightly taxed as
ordinary income."'
Cancellations and terminations of leases have caused a substan-
tial amount of litigation, both as to the characterization of the pro-
ceeds and as to the tax treatment of the purchaser. Initially, it must
be determined who has what rights, and by whom payments are
made, as well as the purpose for which they are made, i.e., cancella-
tion or acquisition of the leasehold interest. 7 9 Unfortunately, these
questions frequently merge into each other, and thereby result in
little consistency over a line of what should be consistent cases.
Generally, the courts have placed too much emphasis on the formal
requirements of a "sale or exchange," holding that a lessor cannot
acquire the leasehold from the lessee by purchase because the inter-
est simply vanishes upon its return to the fee.8 0 Instead of taking
such a view, the lease cases should be considered in terms of whether
the transaction meets the requirements of the capital asset provi-
478. See Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56.
479. See Del Cotto, supra note 402, at 10-17. See also Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d
72, 42 A.F.T.R. 914 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953); Kingsbury v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C. 1068 (1976) acq. 1976-2 C.B. 2 (the right to operate a card room was a lease,
the disposition of which came within the scope of § 1231); Morris, Taxation of Leases: Profits
and Pitfalls, 30 Sw. L.J. 435 (1976).
In Kingsbury, the court emphasized the following facts that indicated that the transaction
constituted a lease rather than the disposition of some sort of other nonqualifying property
rights:
(1) The taxpayer was granted the exclusive right to operate the business on the lessor's
premises;
(2) The lessor had no effective control over the taxpayer;
(3) The taxpayer had an unqualified option to renew the agreement for two additional
terms;
(4) The operating agreement was to terminate upon the death of the taxpayer, and not
upon the death of the lessor;
(5) The taxpayer could retain all gross receipts after the payment of a fixed monthly fee
to the lessor;
(6) The taxpayer made a lump-sum payment to the lessor for the rights under the agree-
ment.
65 T.C. at 1083-85.
480. For several examples, see Del Cotto, supra note 402, at 10-17.
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sions and can be distinguished from a routine business transfer.,"
Whether an assignment or cancellation of a contract or lease re-
sults in capital or ordinary gain or loss generally depends on whether
the payment received is characterized as a substitute for future
income. For example, the amount received by a lessor for the cancel-
lation of a lease usually is deemed a replacement for rent; neverthe-
less, courts sometimes regard lease-cancellation payments not as
substitutes for future income, but as capital gain. In Hort v.
Commissioner, the Supreme Court held that the consideration re-
ceived by the owner of a building for the cancellation of a lease was
not a return of capital but "merely a substitute for the rent reserved
in the lease";" ' as a result, the taxpayer realized ordinary income.
However, in Metropolitan Building Co. v. Commissioner,13 the
Ninth Circuit allowed the taxpayer-lessee capital gain status on
amounts received from the sublessee for the lessee's release to its
landlord of all rights and interests in the leasehold. The court distin-
guished Hort on the basis that the Metropolitan Building Co. lessee,
in the sale of its entire leasehold interest, sold the income producing
property itself.484 In contrast, the landlord in Hort retained the capi-
tal asset-the building-and merely accelerated future rents.4 5
In order to distinguish between the two situations it must be
determined whether the asset involved is "property" of the type
which is a capital asset under section 1221, whether there has been
a sale or exchange, and whether the payment received upon the
assignment, cancellation, novation, or release of contract rights is a
substitute for future ordinary income.488 Moreover, the present sale
of the future right to earned income must be delineated clearly from
the present sale of the future right to earn income.4 8
481. See Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56; Del Cotto, supra note 402, at 59-60.
482. 313 U.S. 29, 31, 25 A.F.T.R. 1207 (1941).
483. 282 F.2d 592, 6 A.F.T.R.2d 5493 (9th Cir. 1960).
484. Id. at 594; accord, Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72, 42 A.F.T.R. 914 (3d Cir.
1952).
485. See Del Cotto, supra note 402, at 15-17. See also I.R.C. § 1241, which treats the
cancellation or termination of a lease as a sale or exchange as to the lessee. It does not apply
to the lessor, nor does it classify the receipts as capital gain or loss. Rather, it simply supplies
the sale or exchange needed for capital gains treatment.
486. See Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56; Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72, 42
A.F.T.R. 914 (3d Cir. 1952).
487. See Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56; cf. Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824, 35
A.F.T.R.2d 75-1640 (9th Cir. 1975) (purported private annuity transaction was in fact the
transfer of a remainder with a reservation of a life estate). See generally Chirelstein, supra
note 446; Eustice, supra note 402; Grayck, Taxing Income That is Applied Against the
Purchase Price, 12 TAx L. Rav. 381 (1957); Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 405; Note,
Distinguishing Ordinary Income from Capital Gain Where Rights to Future Income Are Sold,
69 HARv. L. REV. 737 (1956); Comment, The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and
Ordinary Income, 73 YALE L.J. 693 (1964); see also Part Two, supra note 2, section III. E. and
the sources cited therein as to bootstrap sales and the payment of the purchase price from
the business's current income.
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